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Interpreting the European Union’s IFRS
Endorsement Criteria: The Case of IFRS 9
JANNIS BISCHOF and HOLGER DASKE
Area of Accounting & Taxation, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany
ABSTRACT EU Regulation requires that any international accounting standards (International
Financial Reporting Standards, IFRS) and interpretations (IFRIC) pronounced by the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) meet three sets of criteria before they become binding for EU-
based companies: a ‘true and fair view’ criterion, a list of qualitative criteria, and a ‘European
public good’ criterion. During the endorsement process, EU institutions evaluate each standard or
interpretation’s compliance with these three criteria. Nevertheless, despite plenty of past
endorsement decisions, there is still disagreement about a unanimous interpretation of the criteria in
the literature. In this study, we interpret all three criteria against the background of European
accounting law and academic accounting research. Then, the paper illustrates for the case of the
new IFRS 9 standard on accounting for financial instruments how these criteria can be applied in
the endorsement practice. We conclude that the standard cannot reasonably be rejected on grounds
of the IAS Regulation. We also explain that the vagueness of the endorsement criteria and the
inherent discretion in the eventual endorsement decision help maintain the EU’s political influence
on the IASB’s standard-setting ex ante.
Keywords: European Union, IFRS, endorsement, true and fair view, European public good, bank
accounting
JEL classification: K22, M41, M48
1. Introduction
In the European Union (EU), international accounting standards (International Financial Report-
ing Standards, IFRS) and interpretations (IFRIC) that the International Accounting Standards
Board (IASB) has officially pronounced must await an additional endorsement procedure
before they become binding for EU-based companies. The endorsement procedure involves a
formal examination of the standard or interpretation. IAS Regulation 1606/2002 introduces a
set of three criteria for this examination: (1) a ‘true and fair view’ (TFV) criterion, (2) a list
of qualitative criteria, and (3) a ‘European public good’ (EPG) criterion. Perhaps surprisingly,
almost 15 years after introduction of the endorsement criteria and after many, at times contro-
versial, endorsement decisions by the EU, a comprehensive interpretation of these criteria is
still missing, and there is considerable disagreement about such an interpretation in prior
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literature (e.g. Alexander & Eberhartinger, 2010; Nobes, 2006, 2015; Wu¨stemann & Kierzek,
2006). In this study, we attempt to provide such a comprehensive interpretation of the criteria
against the background of European accounting law and academic research. In a second step,
the paper illustrates how these criteria can be applied in the endorsement practice for the case
of the new IFRS 9 standard on financial instruments accounting.
While we attempt to provide a comprehensive interpretation of the endorsement criteria, we
acknowledge that some degree of vagueness in these criteria is part of the EU’s strategy to main-
tain its influence over financial accounting rules that are binding for publicly traded EU firms.
This vagueness ensures maximum political influence of the EU on the IASB’s standard-
setting ex ante, that is, during the due process, by keeping discretion in the political endorsement
process ex post. The discretion in the endorsement decision avoids an unconditional delegation
of standard setting to a private body. A mechanical ‘tick-the-box’ approach would substantially
reduce such discretion and, accordingly, dampen the influence beforehand. In the case of IFRS 9,
we observe that several EU institutions (European Financial Reporting Advisory Group
(EFRAG), European Banking Authority (EBA), European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Authority (EIOPA), European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)) made use of their
power and intervened in the IASB’s development of the new standard (see also Walton,
2015). Consistent with the vague endorsement criteria ensuring maximum influence, the
IASB was responsive to these interventions and changed the standard multiple times before
its final pronouncement.
It is against this background that we address the interpretation of the endorsement criteria. We
do so in separate chapters for each of the criteria and, thus, contribute to different debates in
financial accounting. First, we add to the discussion about the interpretation of the TFV principle
introduced by European accounting regulation (e.g. Alexander, 1993, 2006; Nobes, 2006; Ordel-
heide, 1993; Wu¨stemann & Kierzek, 2006). On the one hand, the TFV is viewed as a dynamic
criterion that largely refers to common accounting practice accepted by market participants. On
the other hand, the TFV can be understood as being reflective of the general spirit and individual
norms of the Accounting Directives. Most notably, a 1996 European Court of Justice (ECJ)
verdict named the prudence principle as the core of the European TFV principle. Nevertheless,
even when great emphasis is placed on the Accounting Directive’s prudence principle, the use of
fair value accounting per se is not harmful to the TFV criterion (Nobes, 2015, comes to a similar
conclusion). We conclude that this is especially true when the use of fair value accounting is as
limited as in IFRS 9 and that the conditional conservatism of reported earnings is likely to
increase as a result of the new expected credit loss model for loan impairments.
Second, we argue that the four qualitative criteria (‘understandability, relevance, reliability,
and comparability required of the financial information needed for making economic decisions
and assessing the stewardship of management’) are of a technical nature. Their definitions are
well established in the accounting literature (e.g. Barth, 2007; Barth, Beaver, & Landsman,
2001; Maines & Wahlen, 2006), as is their operationalisation in accounting research. Still,
many criteria conflict with each other, with the most prominent trade-off probably being that
between relevance and reliability. Therefore, an overall assessment of the criteria requires indi-
vidual judgement and weighting of different interests (e.g. of shareholders and lenders). In our
analysis at least some aspects of IFRS 9 score high on many of the four criteria. We conclude that
the qualitative criteria do not provide convincing grounds for rejecting the endorsement of IFRS 9.
Third, we discuss the EPG criterion, which is unique to the IAS Regulation but at the same
time fails to provide a clear-cut definition (e.g. Alexander & Eberhartinger, 2010; Camfferman
& Zeff, 2015; Van Hulle, 2004). Economics and political sciences offer different definitions of
the public good and these definitions are partially incompatible. The recent Maystadt Report
(2013) proposes that the criterion be interpreted in light of a standard’s effect on financial
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stability and the EU’s economic development. However, the operationalisation of these
additional criteria is at least as vague as for the EPG per se. In our view, the only feasible
way to assess the EPG is by means of a comprehensive cost–benefit analysis that considers
the reactions of different stakeholders to the proposed standard. Nevertheless, no cost–benefit
analysis will lead to a unanimous conclusion, because, by definition, the costs and benefits
will be borne by different parties affected by the final standard. Ultimately, it is thus a purely
political decision of how to weight these different costs and benefits of different parties. At
this stage, the EU completely maintains the intended discretion about the eventual endorsement
decision. We still conclude that, with the exception of perhaps the insurance industry, we do not
see any one party that, in the long run, will have to bear too significant of a cost as a result of
IFRS 9 implementation.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the three endorsement criteria and the pol-
itical process leading to the endorsement decision. Sections 3–5 provide an individual assess-
ment of each of the three endorsement criteria for a new IFRS/IFRIC in the EU. In Section 6,
we conclude by discussing the implications of our interpretation of the endorsement criteria
for the political decision in the case of IFRS 9.
2. The EU Endorsement of IFRS 9
2.1. Endorsement Criteria
Regulation (EU) 1606/2002 (IAS Regulation) introduced the endorsement of IAS/IFRS and
related Standard Interpretations Committee/International Financial Reporting Interpretations
Committee interpretations (SIC/IFRIC) in the EU. Because IFRS are prepared by a private
body, that is, the London-based IASB, the Regulation established an EU endorsement process
for all IFRS pronounced by the IASB. The process requires, inter alia, the evaluation of each
accounting standard or interpretation against a set of pre-defined criteria before they can
become effective for European firms. The endorsement process1 ensures that the EU maintains
its influence over financial accounting rules that are binding for listed EU firms and avoids an
unconditional delegation of standard setting to a private body over which the EU has no
formal influence (Wu¨stemann, Bischof, & Wu¨stemann, 2012).
Under Article 3(2) IAS Regulation, an international accounting standard can only be endorsed
if
. it is not contrary to the principle set out in ex-Article 2(3) of Directive 78/660/EEC and in
ex-Article 16(3) of Directive 83/349/EEC (the ‘TFV’ principle),2
. it is conducive to the EPG, and
. it meets the criteria of understandability, relevance, reliability, and comparability
required of the financial information needed for making economic decisions and assessing
the stewardship of management.
The IAS Regulation does not offer a more precise definition for any of the three criteria, nor do
the Accounting Directives. Concepts such as the TFV or the relevance and reliability of account-
ing numbers are controversial in the accounting literature, with different definitions of each
concept being used simultaneously. Therefore, a clear-cut application of the endorsement cri-
teria is not possible, and involved EU institutions3 at each stage of the endorsement process
are left with considerable discretion regarding their decisions on the endorsement of IFRS.
This paper aims to develop a framework against which to judge a new IFRS standard or IFRIC
interpretation. In particular, the paper outlines the different dimensions by which an
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endorsement criterion can be interpreted and examines for the case of IFRS 9 how the new stan-
dard fares in relation to these different dimensions.
2.2. Key Endorsement Decisions
The application of the endorsement criteria in previous decisions provides some evidence of how
the criteria were interpreted in the practice of EU law-making. The European Commission
makes these decisions publicly available on its website.4 Until today, all standards and all
interpretations except one that were originally pronounced by the IASB were eventually
endorsed by the EU and thus became binding accounting law for EU firms. In the case of
IFRIC 3 on emission rights accounting, EFRAG advised against endorsement, and the IASB
eventually withdrew the Interpretation, that is, there was no formal vote by any EU institution.
These observations highlight that the endorsement process plays a more proactive role by
making the EU a credible threat towards the IASB and thereby giving the EU greater power
to intervene ex ante in the process of standard setting. The reclassification amendments to
IAS 39 and IFRS 7 at the peak of the financial crisis in October 2008 are one illustrative
example of the significant influence the EU has over the IASB (see Andre´, Cazavan-Jeny,
Dick, Richard, & Walton, 2009; Bischof, Bru¨ggemann, & Daske, 2014). However, there are
three (two) notable exceptions where a new standard (interpretation) was at least controversial
in the endorsement process and where, in two cases, the endorsed standard differed from the
original standard pronounced by the IASB (see Table 1 for an overview).
The history of endorsement decisions demonstrates that all three criteria are binding in the
assessment of an accounting standard (or interpretation):
. The first controversy about the IAS 39 full fair value option for liabilities is related to the
TFV principle (criterion (1)). The EU decision highlights that the TFV was interpreted in
light of the two European Accounting Directives that did not permit a complete fair value
balance sheet in achieving the TFV (Wu¨stemann & Bischof, 2007).
. The second controversy about hedge accounting in IAS 39 is related, at least indirectly, to
the EPG (criterion (2)). The reasons presented to justify the carve-out were related to econ-
omic outcomes, such as artificial market volatility, that are potentially harmful for the
European economy. In this decision, the EU also referred to the potential implementation
costs for the financial industry, suggesting that a cost–benefit analysis is one means of
operationalising the assessment of the EPG. Similar reasoning applies to the controversy
about IFRIC 12, in which case the European Commission delayed its endorsement
decision for two years, mainly in response to objections from Spain that were implicitly
related to the EPG.
. The third controversy concerned the decision usefulness of the management approach
underlying IFRS 8 for financial statement users such as analysts. This concern is what
the relevance criterion (criterion (3)) typically captures in accounting research.
. The fourth controversy about IFRIC 3 led to the IASB eventually withdrawing the stan-
dard after EFRAG issued a negative recommendation. EFRAG’s recommendation
referred to both violations of the TFV criterion (1) and the qualitative criteria (3).
The history of enforcement actions also shows that carve-outs place an additional burden on
firms that have equity shares cross-listed on the US capital market (approx. 80 major European
firms as of 2014). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) only accepts a firm’s IFRS
reports as being equivalent to financial statements based on US Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) if the firms make no use of any EU carve-out. Therefore, cross-listed firms
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tend to emphasise in the footnotes to their financial statements that their IFRS application is con-
sistent with both EU regulations and the original IFRS as pronounced by the IASB. The more an
EU version of the IFRS deviates from the original IFRS, the higher will be the costs of achieving
simultaneous consistency through firms’ accounting choices.
2.3. Public Perception of the Endorsement Process
From its inception, the endorsement process itself has been subject to public debate among
researchers, practitioners, and regulators. To consider potential implications of an endorsement
decision ex ante, it is important to be aware of these perceptions.
At its core, the endorsement process seems to conflict with the underlying objective of Euro-
pean IFRS adoption and the EU’s financial reporting strategy because the EU’s financial report-
ing strategy seeks to establish greater comparability of financial statements worldwide and to
ease the acceptance of EU firms’ financial statements on capital markets outside the EU
(most notably in the US).5 However, the comparability of financial statements of firms domiciled
in different IFRS adopting countries and the acceptance of European financial statements by the





IAS 39 Fair value
option for
liabilities
‘Article 42a of the Fourth Company Law Directive (Directive
78/660/EECa) does not allow full fair valuation of all
liabilities; the main category of liabilities excluded from
fair valuation is companies fair valuing their own debt.
Companies are therefore not allowed to use the full fair
value option.’ European Commission (2004).
IAS 39 Hedge
accounting
‘[The carve-out] reflects criticism by the majority of
European banks, which argued that IAS 39 in its current
form would force them into disproportionate and costly
changes both to their asset/liability management and to
their accounting systems and would produce unwarranted
volatility.’ European Commission (2004).
IFRS 8 Segment
reporting
‘The impact assessment carried out by the Commission did
not sufficiently take into account the interests of users.’
European Parliament (2007).
IFRIC 3 (withdrawn) Emission rights ‘EFRAG believes that application of IFRIC 3 will not always
result in relevant financial information because in certain
cases it does not faithfully represent the economic reality’.
‘EFRAG also believes that the disadvantages that would arise
from endorsing the interpretation outweigh the advantages





‘It has been argued that IFRIC 12 would make service
concession activities economically less attractive and
thereby make private sector financed infrastructure
projects more difficult.
During the [cost-benefit] analysis, Commission Services have
found no evidence that IFRIC 12 would have such
consequences.’ European Commission (2008b).
Source: Authors’ research.
aThe directive has been replaced by Directive 2013/34/EU. The new Directive continues to prohibit the full fair value
accounting for liabilities (see Article 8), that is, the endorsement concern is still valid.
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SEC are both at risk when the endorsement decision leads to carve-outs or other deviations of the
EU version of IFRS from the original IASB-issued standards. That is, the decision not to endorse
a standard is economically costly; prior evidence has shown that equity shares of EU firms had
abnormal decreases in value when the decision about the IAS 39 carve-outs became publicly
known in 2004 (see Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer, & Riedl, 2010). The literature views this con-
flict as a strategic dilemma that the EU faces in its decisions.
An alternative to the current endorsement criteria would be a formal process resulting in the
mechanical endorsement of all IASB pronouncements when a pre-defined set of precise criteria
is met (‘check-list’ or ‘tick-box’ approach).6 Nevertheless, we argue that if the process were
indeed mechanical, the EU would lose much of its political power over the IASB, which has
steadily increased over the last decade (e.g. Walton, 2015). The reason is that the IASB could
exactly predict at which point the pre-defined set of criteria would be technically met, and
from that point onwards, the EU would lose any further influence. Therefore, in the current equi-
librium, the endorsement criteria must provide EU institutions with at least some flexibility to
deny the endorsement, which, at the same time, should lead to the IASB changing the standards
beforehand in response to feedback from EU institutions, rather than those changes being
implemented throughout the endorsement process.
Against this background, it is important to note that the IASB’s development in the case of
IFRS 9 was a six-year process of extensive consultation and debate starting in 2009 where
several EU institutions became involved at different stages; this involvement did have an
impact on the eventual standard. For example, institutions such as EFRAG, EBA, EIOPA,
and ESMA frequently participated in the IASB’s due process,7 during which the IASB
changed the standard significantly multiple times. When conducting our background research
for this paper, we also examined the participation of EU institutions in the IFRS 9 due
process and the IASB’s responsiveness to comment letters. Based on these observations, we con-
clude that the IASB has taken positions brought forward by EU institutions seriously (see also
Walton, 2015).8 In fact, we argue that the IASB’s behaviour is purely rational, as the private
body itself struggles to gain legitimacy and funding (e.g. Danjou & Walton, 2012; Sunder,
2009), which are both severely threatened by a standard’s failure in the EU endorsement
process. Consistent with our view, observers of the SEC’s role in the convergence project
claim that the IASB’s responsiveness to EU interests explains why the project is currently put
on hold by the SEC (see Katz, 2014; Zeff, 2012).
There is wide consensus in the accounting literature that the present endorsement criteria lack
precision, and there is a considerable unresolved debate about the correct interpretation of these
criteria (see Alexander, 2006; Alexander & Eberhartinger, 2010; Wu¨stemann & Kierzek, 2005,
2006). However, while many commentators view the broad endorsement criteria as being too
vague to establish legal certainty (see Schmidt, Berg, & Schmidt, 2011; Wu¨stemann &
Kierzek, 2005, 2006), it is the vagueness of the criteria that largely establishes the political dis-
cretion necessary for the EU to have influence over the IASB ex ante. Uncertainty about the cri-
teria impedes the IASB’s ability to exactly anticipate the outcome of the process and, thus, gives
EFRAG and other EU institutions more leverage in negotiations.
At the same time, the vagueness of the criteria makes the endorsement process susceptible to
firms lobbying for special interests. For example, some call the application of the endorsement
criteria in regards to IAS 39 of ‘dubious merit’ (Nobes & Parker, 2008, p. 226). Former French
President Jacques Chirac’s famous letter to then-President of the European Commission,
Romano Prodi, on the subject of hedge accounting provides evidence that there needs to be pol-
itical support at the highest level for an accounting standard to be put on hold during the endor-
sement process (see Walton, 2004; Whittington, 2008).9 Thus, it is probably fair to emphasise
that the EU’s previous endorsement decisions led to the public impression that the process
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provides solely a means for national politicians to become involved ex post, that is, after the
IASB’s due process, and allows them to cater to vested interests.
Overall, and at the most general level, we caution against a premature decision not to endorse
any standard, as such a decision would almost certainly lead to substantial economic costs and
potentially hamper the EU’s influence over the IASB in the future.10 In light of this evidence, the
endorsement criteria need to be regarded with great care, and the following chapters aim to
provide a framework for such an assessment.
3. The TFV Criterion
The first endorsement criterion states that IFRS shall not be contrary to the principle set out in
ex-Article 2(3) of Directive 78/660/EEC (4th Company Law Directive) and in ex-Article 16(3)
of Directive 83/349/EEC (7th Company Law Directive), that is: ‘The annual accounts shall give
a true and fair view of the company’s assets, liabilities, financial position and profit or loss’.
When these Directives were repealed by the Accounting Directive 2013/34/EC, the wording
was taken up in Article 4(3) but framed within a broader and more descriptive context; see
Appendix 1. In the accounting literature, this principle is known as the TFV principle. In this
chapter, we (a) review the understanding of the TFV under the 4th and 7th Company Law Direc-
tives, (b) evaluate the interpretation of the TFV criterion in the endorsement process against this
historical background, and (c) assess whether and, if so, to what extent the TFV comprises the
prudence principle, as is frequently argued in the academic literature and in political debates.
3.1. The Lack of a Common TFV Interpretation under the EU’s Accounting Directives
In line with the EU’s objective to establish a common market (ex-Article 2 EC Treaty, now
internal market in Article 3(3) Treaty on EU, Article 26 Treaty on the Functioning of the
EU), the Commission started a process of harmonising national European accounting law.
The effort resulted in the 4th and 7th Company Law Directives. The goal of these Directives
was to create a ‘level playing field’ in a single market while still accepting differences in national
implementation. It was the 4th Directive in 1978 that initially introduced the requirement for
company accounts to provide a TFV.
While its historical origins lie in UK case law (see Alexander, 1993, p. 61), the principle is
undefined and without a clear predecessor. Its great importance comes from the fact that first,
through the Accounting Directives, it has become, from a legal point of view, one of the
leading accounting principles for EU Member States (see Ordelheide, 1993, p. 81). Second,
the different perceptions of its meaning and significance ever since its introduction into law
‘are symptomatic of different cultural, legal and accounting attributes’ (Alexander, 1993,
p. 72) in the EU. Even today, after almost 40 years in existence, these different perceptions
on what constitutes TFV remain significant.
These different perceptions are aggravated by different terminology and different legal stand-
ing that national legislators used in the integration of the TFV principle into national law (see
Aisbitt & Nobes, 2001). Given that EU institutions accept largely heterogeneous and, in part,
even contradictory measurement options into national accounting laws (see Ordelheide, 1993,
p. 85), it seems clear that the EU had a broad understanding of the TFV principle. In addition,
there is no ECJ decision that has pronounced an opinion on the consistency of different national
interpretations of TFV in regard to the Accounting Directives.
Germany and the UK represent the extreme ends of the opposite approaches to TFV. In the
UK interpretation, which is based on accounting practice under British case-law tradition
with an emphasis on professional judgement of the accounting profession, the 4th Company
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Law Directive of 1978 gives TFV ‘an overriding importance, over and above “the provisions of
this Directive”’ (Alexander, 1993, p. 61). For British lawyers, TFV is a ‘dynamic concept’
(Arden, 1993, para. 14), and ‘legislators or standard setters can affect its meaning by constrain-
ing practice, as can companies by making policy choices’ (Nobes, 2006, p. 85). Thus, the UK
interpretation attaches an importance to TFV that justifies deviations from other accounting
rules (i.e. a TFV ‘override’). These deviations occur frequently in UK accounting practice,
with 1141 observations noted just for the five-year period from 1998 to 2002 (see Livne &
McNichols, 2009, Table 1).
In contrast, in the German Roman law-based tradition, the methodology of legal interpretation
requires gaps and ambiguities in the law to be closed in the context of the law itself. Thus, the
more-specific ex-Article 31 on valuation principles (such as prudence) and the individual legal
accounting rules of ex-Articles 34-42 of the 4th Company Law Directive 78/660/EEC were used
to interpret the TFV.11 Hence, by definition, a TFV is achieved if an account fully complies with
all the individual rules stated in the Directive and, thus, allows no room for any override. Infor-
mational shortcomings that might arise from a too-prudent application of measurement rules
shall rather be addressed in qualitative footnote disclosures (see Moxter, 1979; Ordelheide,
1993). These different approaches have implications for the role of prudence in the interpretation
of the TFV principle, as it is only under the latter view that the TFV explicitly comprises the
prudence principle.12
The two different approaches to TFV involve different risks of ‘misreporting’. The UK pos-
ition risks excessive violations of rules and earnings management based on TFV overrides, while
the German position risks that a strict application of the rules may fail, in abnormal circum-
stances, to provide an adequate picture of the firm. We note, however, that empirical evidence
indicates that there is a sufficient degree of flexibility in preparing financial statements under
either approach, as any accounting rule offers some leeway for managers (e.g. Ball, 2006;
Ball, Robin, & Wu, 2003; Burgstahler, Hail, & Leuz, 2006). Under the ‘incentives-based
view’ that is now broadly established in the accounting literature (see Burgstahler et al.,
2006; Christensen, Hail, & Leuz, 2013; Daske, Hail, Leuz, & Verdi, 2008, 2013; Leuz,
Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003), it is clear that even a restrictive accounting system leaves consider-
able room for judgements. In particular, a number of large sample-based empirical studies have
consistently documented that the less flexible Germanic accounting systems have significantly
more earnings management in reporting practice than the more flexible British system (e.g.
Daske, Gebhardt, & McLeay, 2006; Leuz et al., 2003). The robust findings illustrate that the
TFV override that was fiercely discussed at the time of introduction has not been shown to be
of first-order importance for actual financial reporting outcomes in more than 20 years of
application.
We finally comment that the European Commission, through statements of its Contact Com-
mittee on Accounting Directives and its former Head of Unit for Accounting Standards, Karel
Van Hulle, took two notable stands in the debate. First, it became clear that the TFV principle
must be applied to the specific company (see European Commission, 1998), and ‘Member States
cannot introduce rules or standards which would be contrary to the rules in the Directive, other-
wise the harmonisation objective would be seriously impaired’ (Van Hulle, 1997, p. 714).13 The
statement puts at least some limit to the ‘dynamic concept’ of TFV interpretation and to the view
that ‘in short: true and fair is what British accountants declare it to be’ (Ordelheide, 1993, p. 82).
Second, Van Hulle (1997, p. 719) commented that the introduction of TFV is an ‘admission of
modesty on behalf of the regulator’, because ‘no regulator is perfect and the accounting rules and
standards which have been designed for the majority of cases can never take account for all cases
which may arise in practice’.
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3.2. The Role of the TFV Interpretation in the IFRS Endorsement Process
The IAS Regulation’s direct reference to the Accounting Directives’ TFV principle sheds a
different light on the problem of the TFV interpretation. While practical implementation of
the Accounting Directives resulted in some equilibrium over the years, with different
Member States following different interpretations under national accounting principles, the
endorsement process of IFRS/IFRIC requires a uniform ‘European’ interpretation of the TFV
criterion. In short, the question in this context is whether the criterion fails whenever a new
IFRS is inconsistent with any part of the Accounting Directives or whether the criterion is a
dynamic, albeit less precise, one.
Evidence from prior EU legislation is inconclusive: On the one hand, the EU endorsed IFRS 3
‘Business Combinations’ early in the process, and the standard became binding European
accounting law in 2005. The standard does not allow for the systematic amortisation of pur-
chased goodwill, which was, and still is, incompatible with the wording of Articles 34 and 37
of the 4th Company Law Directive. The EU’s assessment that the standard still meets the
TFV criterion clearly implies that IFRS do not need to map one-to-one into the Accounting
Directives in order to be able to establish a TFV.
On the other hand, the amending Directive 2003/51/EC aligned with a narrower view. The
Directive amended the original Accounting Directives in 2003 by permitting the broader use
of fair values in national accounting laws. The change was explicitly motivated by the need
to facilitate the endorsement of IFRS. It was argued that the change in the fair value rules
was necessary for the spirit of the Directives to be in general accordance with IFRS so that a
TFV could be reasonably achieved through IFRS application (see Directive 2003/51/EC, Reci-
tals 6-8). Directive 2003/51/EC thus suggests that individual accounting rules outlined in the
EU’s Accounting Directives do matter for the interpretation of the TFV principle.
The only ECJ ruling on the interpretation of TFV14 (declared years before the IAS Regu-
lation) also supports the narrower view. In the context of the Tomberger/Wettern Case in
1996 (Case C-234/94), the ECJ clarified that the ‘Application of that [i.e. the TFV] principle
must, as far as possible, be guided by the general principles contained in Article 31 of the
Fourth Directive’ (European Court of Justice, 1996, para. 18). That understanding follows a
more restrictive interpretation of Article 2(5), which would mean that TFV ‘cannot act as the
basis for the establishment of fundamentally different accounting principles and rules contradic-
tory to the explicitly stated principles and rules of the EC Directive’ (Ordelheide, 1993, p. 83).15
Following the ruling, consistency with at least Article 31 must be necessary for a TFV to be
achieved. This is one key reason commentators emphasise the importance of Article 31’s pru-
dence principle for the endorsement process (e.g. Wu¨stemann & Kierzek, 2005, 2006).
However, the Tomberger/Wettern case was a highly specific one. The court even noted that ‘it
should be emphasised at the outset that [ . . . ] the question arises in the context of highly specific
circumstances’.16 Even though the Court referred to the principles in Article 31 of the 4th
Company Law Directive (such as prudence), the Court’s actual verdict resulted in earlier rec-
ognition of dividends (which goes against prudence). The ECJ also seems to accept that there
can be different national meanings and not only one binding interpretation of TFV. The Court
did not conclude that the unapproved dividends should be treated as revenue (para. 25) but
rather that it is not contrary to TFV for a national court to consider that the profits in question
must be entered in the parent company’s balance sheet (see Nobes, 2006). Nobes (2006) inter-
prets this statement as evidence that there can be multiple TFVs, consistent with the view that
there is no ‘the’ TFV, but rather ‘a’ TFV. Accordingly, ‘endorsement of an IFRS can be quite
proper even if a non-IFRS treatment could also give a TFV’ (Nobes, 2006, p. 82).
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3.3. The Role of the Prudence Principle for the Application of the TFV Criterion
For the endorsement of a new IFRS/IFRIC (such as IFRS 9), the most controversial issue with
the TFV criterion is the new standard’s potential failure to comply with the prudence principle.
As discussed above, compliance with the prudence principle outlined in Article 31 of the 4th
Company Law Directive (and Article 6 of the new Accounting Directive 2013/34/EU) is
viewed by some as a pre-condition for a standard to comply with the TFV principle. Our discus-
sion of prior endorsement decisions and evidence on TFV interpretation in individual Member
States shows that this link can be challenged on very reasonable grounds. In particular, the link
hinges on whether the TFV principle itself embodies the prudence principle, as the IAS Regu-
lation does not directly require the latter principle to be tested in the endorsement process. Yet,
the following discussion is based on the assumption that a new IFRS/IFRIC will need to follow
the prudence principle for meeting the TFV criterion. Also, as a matter of practical fact, EFRAG
consider prudence in their (Draft) Endorsement Advice to be a component of TFV, and they test
whether a new IFRS/IFIC leads to prudent accounting.17
Against the background of IFRS 9, an obvious reason for placing importance on prudence is
the dissatisfaction with the role of accounting standards (and, most notably, IFRS) in the finan-
cial crisis. The G20 in its 2009 London Summit explicitly urged the standard setters to improve
the standards on valuation and provisioning (see G20, 2009, para. 15). The perception was that a
lack of prudence in IFRS helped create the over-expansion of credit, unrealised profits, and,
therefore, unjustified bonuses and dividends.18 The role of fair value accounting in the crisis
was heavily debated even by the highest ranks of political leaders (see Andre´ et al., 2009).
However, empirical findings in the academic literature that have emerged in the years following
the crisis paint a more balanced picture. Based on this evidence, the Basel Committee concluded
in a recent report that there is (still) no evidence that would support the notion that fair value
accounting triggered or even exaggerated the crisis.19
One should also note that fair value accounting is not only about the recognition of unrea-
lised gains, but also requires the early recognition of expected losses. Overwhelming
evidence in the accounting literature suggests that early anticipation of future losses is
key to oversight bodies (board of directors or prudential regulators) being able to implement
corrective measures in time (e.g. Beatty & Liao, 2011; Bushman, inpress; Bushman &
Williams, 2015). However, there are significant delays in taking impairments and write-
downs of assets measured in other ways than fair value in times of crisis (e.g. Vyas,
2011). Recent research also provides evidence that the public fair value debate in the
media and by US congresspersons was rather fostered by the vested interests of the
banking industry to avoid the reporting of losses (see Bischof, Daske, & Sextroh, 2016;
Becker, Daske, & Sextroh, 2016). More generally, when analysing banks’ lobbying activi-
ties against fair value accounting, it has been shown that it was the opaque banks that
were most actively calling for more-prudent accounting practices (see Hodder & Hopkins,
2014). Overall, this collective evidence convincingly suggests that the objectives behind
the prudence principle outlined in the Accounting Directives (e.g. financial stability) may
instead be mainly achieved through fair value reporting. Vice versa, too strict of a historical
cost regime potentially endangers these objectives to an even greater extent.
Consistent with this view, there is no other EU legislation or ECJ judgement that would
directly link the prudence principle to pure historical cost accounting. In fact, the EU seems
to accept that different Member States have different interpretations of prudence (e.g. Evans,
2004).
We note that there are different understandings of ‘prudence’. The concept is often used inter-
changeably with the concept of ‘conservatism’ that is rooted in the US literature.20 While not
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necessarily identical, it is still useful for the assessment of IFRS 9 to consult the empirical
accounting literature that tests the economic effects of ‘conservatism’ in two different forms
(see Watts, 2003):
. unconditional conservatism (ex ante and unrelated to news), which mechanically measures
assets at an amount lower, and liabilities at an amount higher, than their current value, and
. conditional conservatism (ex post and driven by news on asset values), which incorporates
bad news into asset and liability valuation in a more timely fashion than good news.
Robust evidence indicates that it is conditional conservatism that fosters lower cost of capital,
increases investments, and supports economic growth (e.g. Bushman & Piotroski, 2006; Kim
& Zhang, 2016; Lara, Osma, & Penalva, 2011). Nevertheless, the Continental European
countries whose accounting systems were most restricted to historical cost measurement show
empirically low levels of conditional conservatism in actual reporting outcomes (Bushman &
Piotroski, 2006; Raonic, McLeay, & Asimakopoulos, 2004). Again, these insights from the
empirical literature suggest that viewing prudence in light of a stale application of historical
cost measurement does not necessarily lead to ‘prudent’ reporting outcomes in practice.21
Apart from academic evidence, the Accounting Directives do not limit asset and liability
measurement to historical or amortised cost. Article 7a of the 4th Company Law Directive
and Article 8 of the new Accounting Directive 2013/34/EU provide a number of options for
Member States to permit the use of fair values even beyond the scope of financial instruments.
If strict compliance with individual rules of the Accounting Directives leads to prudent reporting
and ultimately establishes a TFV, fair value measurement per se cannot contradict the TFV prin-
ciple. The new Accounting Directive’s Recital 9 is more explicit:
systems of fair value accounting provide information that can be of more relevance to the
users of financial statements than purchase price or production cost-based information.
Accordingly, Member States should permit the adoption of a fair value system of account-
ing by all undertakings or classes of undertaking.
Ultimately, the question comes down to whether the scope of fair value accounting required by a
new standard such as IFRS 9 is compatible with the EU Accounting Directives. To address this
question, it is helpful to begin by considering the existing reporting practice of European banks
under a previous standard (here, IAS 39) and to gauge the extent to which measurement is likely
Table 2. Use of IAS 39 measurement categories by European banks.
Measurement category
Assets
Mean (%) Median (%) Min (%) Max (%)
Loans and Receivables 71.9 75.7 4.5 98.9
Held to Maturity 1.7 ,.01 0 33.6∑
Amortised Cost 73.6 77.7 4.5 98.9
Trading Securities 7.8 3.1 0 79.4
Derivatives 2.7 1.2 0 29.6
Fair Value Option 4.7 0.9 0 88.6∑
Fair Value 15.3 8.9 0 94.3
Available-for-sale Assets 8.0 5.4 0 54.8
Source: Own data (320 firms, 2006–2010), % of total assets.
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to change. The evidence is summarised in Table 2. The data indicate that the two amortised cost
categories still account for approximately 75% of bank assets and that the use of the fair value
option is actually quite limited (less than 1% of total assets for the median bank).
If we apply this evidence to IFRS 9, most IAS 39 Loans and Receivables and Held to Maturity
assets will likely meet the requirements for amortised cost accounting,22 while IAS 39 fair value
assets will generally continue to be reported at fair value. IFRS 9 adoption will, therefore, increase
fair value usage only modestly, with the average level of fair value usage being substantially lower
than the level of amortised cost. Accounting rules for liabilities will cause even less change to the
measurement bases. It is also important to note that the largest class of fair value assets are trading
securities and derivatives. It is this class of instruments for which many Member States, including
Germany, already prescribe fair value accounting under national accounting law at least for finan-
cial institutions (i.e. in accordance with the Accounting Directives).
Overall, if we benchmark IFRS 9 against the rules embodied in the Accounting Direc-
tives, it is not possible to argue that the new standard systematically deviates from
either the general spirit of the Directives or the individual rules on asset and liability
measurement. We can only apply the prudence principle in the context of these Directives.
There are extremely restrictive interpretations of the prudence principle that seem to
suggest that fair value accounting per se is an imprudent reporting practice. However,
not only are these interpretations purely theoretical, but they are also inconsistent with
the general consensus in the accounting literature of what meaningfully constitutes a
prudent (or ‘conservative’) accounting system. Therefore, these interpretations cannot
play a role in the assessment of an IFRS endorsement (Nobes, 2015, comes to a similar
conclusion). Thus, IFRS 9 meets the prudence principle as it exists under the present
Accounting Directive 2013/34/EU.
3.4. The Role of Footnote Disclosures for the Application of the TFV Criterion
The Accounting Directives frame the TFV concept within a broader context (see also Appendix 1),
and they place additional emphasis on notes disclosures:
Where the application of this Directive would not be sufficient to give a true and fair view
of the undertaking’s assets, liabilities, financial position and profit or loss, such additional
information as is necessary to comply with that requirement shall be given in the notes to
the financial statements. (Italics added by the author)
Taken literally, the framing suggests that any potential violation of TFV in recognition and
measurement could be outweighed by adequate disclosures in the footnotes.23 This interpret-
ation potentially softens the TFV requirement and makes non-endorsement of IFRS/IFRIC
less likely because alternative accounting treatments are often required to be disclosed in the
footnotes. For example, in the case of financial instruments and IFRS 9, corresponding IFRS
7 disclosures provide additional information on alternative measurement bases for the different
categories in the footnotes to the financial statements. EFRAG, in a response letter to the Euro-
pean Commission, already recognised accompanying footnote disclosures required by IFRS 7 in
their evaluation of IFRS 9’s compliance with the TFV principle (see EFRAG, 2015a, p. 2).
However, we caution against overstating the role of note disclosures because, in a strict sense,
the reference to additional footnote disclosures simply confirms that the Accounting Directives
leave little room for compromising fundamental principles of recognition and measurement.
Thus, if the rigorous application of recognition and measurement principles (such as the pru-
dence principle) were to result in a violation of the TFV principle, the solution would not be
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to adjust the measurement base but rather to provide complementary footnote disclosures (Naj-
derek, 2010).
3.5. Conclusions
We conclude that the endorsement of IFRS 9 cannot reasonably be rejected on the grounds of the
TFV criterion (of Article 3(2) IAS Regulation). Overall, we are not convinced that current EU
legislation or available ECJ jurisprudence require annual accounts to comply with the prudence
principle to achieve a TFV. Still, there are prominent views in the literature and strong voices in
the political debate that make this point. However, even if the TFV criterion embodies the pru-
dence principle, this principle can only be interpreted in light of the current Accounting Direc-
tive. In terms of asset and liability measurement, IFRS 9 will not lead to significant deviations
from the accounting rules included in the Accounting Directive (at least in the form of Member
State options). When prudence is interpreted while taking into account the Accounting Directive,
IFRS 9 cannot be judged to result in a violation of this principle.
We still acknowledge that there is an obvious need to limit managerial discretion in account-
ing valuation. The recent financial crises have demonstrated that accounting valuation, among
other actions, can lead to excessive dividend pay-outs, bonus payments or risk-taking. Neverthe-
less, empirical evidence consistently shows that such excessive behaviour is not successfully
prevented through a purely cost-based accounting regime. To the contrary, such a regime
most likely has the most adverse consequences for the stability of financial markets. It also
makes us suspicious, in light of the past crises, that it has been the financial industry and their
associations that have persistently been lobbying for cost-based accounting regimes. Therefore,
we recommend that regulators consult other institutions, such as the enforcement authorities or
prudential supervisors, when aiming to restrict excessive manipulation of accounting figures.
The suspension of fair value accounting, for example, through the rejection of IFRS 9, would
not help achieve this goal.
4. The Qualitative Criteria
The second set of endorsement criteria refers to ‘the technical criteria of understandability, rel-
evance, reliability and comparability required of the financial information needed for making
economic decisions and assessing the stewardship of management’. In this chapter, we (a)
present available definitions for the ‘technical’ criteria – or in the language of standard
setting, ‘qualitative characteristics’ – as well as their operationalisations in the scientific litera-
ture; (b) outline possible conflicts among these criteria when drafting accounting standards; and
(c) offer conclusions on the implications of this analysis for an IFRS endorsement advice based
on these technical criteria, using IFRS 9 as an application case.
4.1. Understandability
All available definitions of the criterion ‘understandability’ require assessing whether the infor-
mation resulting from the application of a standard will be understandable by a knowledgeable
user and not unduly complex.24
The scientific literature has only operationalised the criterion ‘understandability’ in the
context of controlled laboratory experiments. Under laboratory conditions, one is able to
analyse whether different types of presentations of accounting information make a difference
in users’ understanding of that piece of information. On the downside, it remains questionable
how generalisable those insights from the lab are to a real world setting, that is, their external
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validity (see Koonce, Lipe, and McAnally (2005) for a fair value-related example). At the same
time, empirically disentangling the form and style of the presentation of a specific piece of infor-
mation from its content, the reasons for the presentation choice (e.g. the underlying transaction
or business model), and other influences such as simultaneous disclosure events, is almost
impossible when using real world settings, that is, the internal validity is a concern (e.g.
Gassen, 2014). Accordingly, we note that the scientific literature does not offer any guidance
on how one can judge whether a new IFRS standard will lead to understandable and less-
complex information.25 We can therefore only provide a subjective judgement based on our
own perception of the standard’s understandability and complexity.
4.2. Relevance
All available definitions of the ‘relevance’ criterion require relevant information to have an
impact on the economic decisions of users through predictive values (i.e. by helping users to
evaluate past, present or future transactions and other events that impact the firm’s future
cash flows) or through confirmatory values (i.e. by helping users confirm or correct their prior
expectations about the firm).26
The definition assumes that we understand how users incorporate accounting information into
their decision-making and that we can judge what impact an accounting standard will have on
users’ economic decisions. Another challenge is the co-existence of many different user groups
(e.g. equity vs. debt investors, compensation committees, labour representatives, prudential
supervisors), when each group follows a distinct approach on how to formalise expectations
and assess financial reporting information.
The accounting literature has tried to operationalise ‘relevance’ through a number of empirical
proxies and in the context of different research designs, primarily with ‘value relevance’ and ‘earn-
ings quality’ designs. In the value relevance literature, ‘an accounting amount is defined as value
relevant if it has a predicted association with equity market values’ (Barth et al., 2001, p. 79).
Researchers use the level of stock prices or changes in stock returns as valuation benchmarks
against which to assess how well a specific piece of accounting information reflects information
potentially used by investors (see Barth et al., 2001). Under this design, it remains unclear what
is the mechanism behind the association observed.27 This is one key reason why the relevance
of ‘value relevance’ studies for standard setting purposes is highly controversial (see Barth
et al., 2001; Holthausen & Watts, 2001), despite the voluminous evidence documented in the lit-
erature (for IFRS-related studies see Harris & Muller, 1999; Song, Thomas, & Yi, 2010).
In the earnings quality literature, which also attempts to capture the ‘relevance’ of accounting
information (e.g. Dechow, Ge, & Schrand, 2010), researchers use three categories of earnings
quality proxies: (a) the magnitude of earnings management, (b) investor responsiveness to earn-
ings, and (c) external indicators of earnings misstatements. Nevertheless, all of these approaches
share the limitation of needing actual available data for application in practice, and the evalu-
ation is at a very high aggregation level.
4.3. Reliability
Despite its central role, the ‘reliability’ criterion is a ‘complex and elusive construct of account-
ing information’, where ‘[e]ven expert accountants do not necessarily agree on the nature of
reliability characteristics’ (Maines & Wahlen, 2006, p. 400). In addition, ‘[r]eliability is difficult
to specify precisely in accounting standards and practice, and it is difficult to examine directly
with research’ (Maines & Wahlen, 2006, p. 399). Many of these differences stem from different
national backgrounds, with some jurisdictions viewing reliability as comprising the prudence
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principle. There still seems to be a minimum consensus that the following characteristics should
be considered when judging the ‘reliability’ of accounting information:
. completeness,
. free from material error and bias, and
. faithful representation.
Traditionally, the Conceptual Frameworks of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
and IASB have stated that reliability, in combination with relevance, determines the usefulness
of accounting information and that there must be the right balance between relevance and
reliability (see FASB, 1980; IASB, 2010, para. 4.64). The IFRS Conceptual Framework no
longer refers to reliability by name, but rather emphasises two characteristics of reliability,
that is, representational faithfulness, and verifiability,28 where information must be complete,
neutral, and free from error. The IASB argues that the term ‘faithful representation’ describes
those latter aspects better than the term ‘reliability’. This is largely consistent with the view
of the US-based accounting literature on reliability (see Barth et al., 2001; Linsmeier,
2013),29 but it means that the IASB effectively removed one of the IAS Regulation’s qualitative
criteria from its Conceptual Framework (at least in wording). EFRAG, while using different ter-
minology, uses a similar list of characteristics in their assessment of IFRS 9.30
Reliability concerns regarding accounting information arise because the managers preparing
financial statements respond to reporting incentives by ‘interpreting or applying standards in a
non-neutral fashion’ (Maines & Wahlen, 2006, p. 400). In other words, a voluminous academic
literature and common experience of regulators and market participants show that managers use
the inherent discretion in all accounting systems to their advantage. Conservative accounting
standards are supposed to counterbalance this potential bias (see, e.g. Watts & Zimmerman,
1986). The difficulty, however, is that the extent of reliability issues, and the way managers
use their discretion (e.g. through opportunistic accounting choices or through the structuring
of transactions), ‘depend[s] on the interaction between preparers’ specific incentives (including
auditing and enforcement) and the accounting standards’ (Maines & Wahlen, 2006, p. 400). In
addition, different reliability concerns frequently arise under different accounting alternatives,
and there is a trade-off in how one judges the relative importance of these reliability concerns
under each alternative. For example, in accounting for financial instruments during economic
downturns under amortised cost, there is discretion in determining whether an impairment
should be taken, and under fair value accounting, there is discretion in determining the lower
market value when the instrument is not traded. In economic upturns, there is the same discretion
in determining market values under fair value accounting, while under amortised cost there is
discretion in selling and realising only those instruments that have accumulated positive value
changes, while continuing to hold those assets with negative value changes (‘cherry-
picking’). Therefore, both valuation principles, ceteris paribus, potentially lead to overvaluation
of assets in the balance sheet under both economic scenarios. Therefore, we not only need to
identify potential reliability concerns that arise from IFRS 9 adoption, but we also need to
balance those concerns with simultaneous concerns under alternative accounting solutions.
4.4. Comparability
There are two conceptual levels at which the ‘comparability’ criterion can be defined. Tradition-
ally, comparability requires preparers to account for similar economic transactions in the same way
(across firms or over time) and for different economic transactions in different ways (preparer per-
spective).31 More recent definitions instead define the former requirements as ‘consistency’, and
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regard consistency as a component of comparability that helps achieve comparability.32 ‘Compar-
ability’ tends to be more broadly defined as enabling users to identify similarities and differences
between two sets of economic phenomena (user perspective) (see Barth, 2007; Barth, Landsman,
Lang, & Williams, 2012; De Franco, Kothari, & Verdi, 2011; IASB, 2015a, para. 2.24). Thus, this
definition adds the requirement for accounting rules not only to depict similar economic trans-
actions in a similar way and different economic transactions in different ways but also to
enable users to externally identify similarities and differences from the highly aggregated infor-
mation that is presented in the annual reports. Overall, the new definition places significant
additional weight on information presentation and disclosure in financial statements.33
Scientific studies that research comparability typically judge the extent of comparability by
relating aggregate summary measures of the accounts (such as earnings or book values) to aggre-
gate proxies for economic outcomes (such as stock returns).34 However, this approach is not suit-
able for judging a standard ex ante, because the necessary data only becomes available after
adoption of the standard, and the empirical proxies for comparability are at too high of an aggre-
gation level to judge the effect of an individual standard.
Threats to comparability due to inconsistent accounting practices reflecting identical econ-
omic transactions could conceptually emerge primarily from
. the availability of explicit accounting choices and options,
. the usage of managerial discretion inherent in standards, and
. inadequate presentation and disclosure of the actual usage of these options.
Therefore, we base our analysis of whether IFRS 9 meets the requirement of ‘comparability’ on
these conceptual sub-criteria.35
4.5. Trade-offs in Technical Criteria and in Decision Usefulness vs. Stewardship
Information produced under the technical criteria should be useful for making economic
decisions and assessing the stewardship of management. The general definition of the criteria
shows that there exist inherent trade-offs in the four criteria. Moreover, there are sub-character-
istics that need to be considered and balanced in any standard, and there may be additional trade-
offs when these criteria are applied for the intended purpose of a standard.
Table 3 summarises the most important trade-offs that arise in the assessment of the technical
criteria. Additional trade-offs emerge because accounting is a multi-purpose concept that is
designed to address the needs of different user groups.36 For example, the EU endorsement cri-
teria describe the two main purposes as being ‘decision usefulness’ and ‘stewardship’. While, in
short, the former is asking for information to predict future cash flows (i.e. to improve price effi-
ciency) (see Gebhardt, Mora, & Wagenhofer, 2014), the latter provides information that is useful
in assessing management’s past actions (i.e. to improve economic efficiency) (see O’Connell,
2007; Whittington, 2008). Thus, the objectives of decision usefulness and stewardship are poten-
tially achieved through different accounting rules (see Drymiotes & Hemmer, 2013), with the
two different types of efficiencies frequently placing different weight on individual criteria.
Table 4 summarises the most critical of these conflicts (see Gebhardt et al., 2014, p. 110).
4.6. Conclusions
These deliberations demonstrate the great challenges involved in testing an accounting standard
for the four technical criteria prescribed by the IAS Regulation. While the definition of each indi-
vidual criterion is generally accepted among academics (with the exception perhaps of reliability)
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and each one has been operationalised in research, several of the criteria conflict with each other
and involve significant trade-offs. Thus, any endorsement advice based on these criteria is necess-
arily subjective and based on individual perceptions of how well a standard reflects and balances
the different criteria. Overall, we can conclude that IFRS 9 does not clearly contradict any one of
these principles. Most importantly, the less-complex structure of the standard (compared with its
predecessor IAS 39) will likely improve understandability. Apart from this, there are many
accounting issues for which the verdict goes in both directions. Table 5 summarises the most
important of these issues, which leads us to conclude that the endorsement of IFRS 9 as a
whole cannot reasonably be rejected on the grounds of the technical criteria.
5. The Criterion of the EPG
The third endorsement criterion states that IFRS can only be endorsed if ‘they are conducive to
the European public good’. In this chapter, (a) we outline the elusiveness of this criterion and
offer an interpretation of how it entered the endorsement requirements; (b) we summarise
approaches in the literature and from other EU public policy areas that attempt to capture the
concept; (c) we review the accounting standard setters’ approach of cost–benefit analyses
when drafting and evaluating a new accounting standard and the criteria suggested by Philippe
Table 4. Trade-offs between decision usefulness and stewardship.
Trade-off Description
Level of verifiability While investors can discount less verifiable information ex post, contracts define
the use of information ex ante thereby causing verifiability issues which
eliminate its usefulness in contracting and stewardship.
Transactions vs.
expectations
Past transactions are relevant for decision usefulness to update own prior
expectations; for stewardship, past transactions assess whether management
fulfilled its goals; hence, accounting information that is built on past
transactions is more important for stewardship.
Transitory items Transitory items are probably not well suited for decision usefulness because
they make forecasting more difficult, but for stewardship, transitory items can
provide information about how management handled its responsibilities.
Timeliness Decision usefulness benefits more from timely information than stewardship
since the latter puts more weight on the confirmatory function than on timely
provision of information.
Table 3. Trade-offs in the IAS regulation’s technical criteria.
Trade-off Description
Relevance vs. reliability Some information may be conceptually highly relevant for economic
decisions, but so unreliable to measure that its relevance may get
greatly impaired in practice and it is subject to manipulation.
Neutrality vs. prudence/
conservatism
Faithful representation requires information to be presented neutrally
in an unbiased manner, yet strict definitions of prudence require
asymmetric treatment of good vs. bad news.
Relevance vs. comparability To adequately portray a variety of economic transactions, a range of
reporting options may be necessary, but allowing reporting options
will potentially impair comparability across firms.
Completeness (reliability) vs.
understandability
Completeness requires extensive reports with high levels of
disaggregation, while understandability requires less complexity
and more focused reports.
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Maystadt, Special Adviser to Commissioner Barnier; and (d) we summarise the implications for
our endorsement advice in the case of IFRS 9.
5.1. Definition and Intended Use
The IAS Regulation does not explain what is meant by stating that an accounting standard should
be ‘conducive to the European public good’ (EPG). It is therefore open to interpretation. The EU
Commission seems to acknowledge that this criterion is of a ‘political nature’ (Van Hulle, 2004,
p. 369). Critics go further in arguing that this criterion is ‘inherently incapable of interpretation
in an objective or operationally effective way’ (Alexander, 2006, p. 71)37 in endorsement
decisions. Proponents counter-argue that one benefit of the criterion could be to grant a ‘more
flexible approach taking into account the specifiers of each standard’ (Expert Group on the
IAS Regulation, 2014, p. 3).
When analysing how the EPG criterion became an endorsement criterion, we observe a shift
in semantics in the process, which has implications on the feasibility of capturing this criterion in
endorsement advice. The precise wording in Recital 9 of the IAS Regulation reads
To adopt an international accounting standard for application in the Community, it is
necessary [. . .] that, in accordance with the conclusions of the Council of 17 July 2000,
it is conducive to the European public good. (Italics added by the author)
Thus, the motivation to include this endorsement criterion seems to date back to these intentions
of the Council. However, in the minutes to the 2283rd Council meeting referenced above, the
EU’s Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) states in Recital 3 to their new Euro-
pean accounting strategy that
In recognising these international accounting standards, the European Community
will ensure that they are in fact conducive to the European public good and that
they can be used by European undertakings with full legal certainty. (Council of
the EU, 2000, p. 8, Italics added by the author)
We infer from the words ‘they’ and ‘in fact’, from the content of the surrounding Recitals, and
from the shift in the Council’s strategy to move from local GAAP to supporting IFRS that the
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Council may have had different intentions at the time. First, the term ‘in fact’ indicates that the
Commission should make sure to monitor that adopting IAS/IFRS as a reporting system really
delivers (ex post) the net benefits to the EU that proponents expected. We think that this state-
ment has to be interpreted against the background of national resistance, at the time, to move
away from local GAAP (see as an example Hoarau, 1995). Second, the term ‘they’ is consistent
with our interpretation that IAS/IFRS as a reporting system (rather than an individual standard)
should deliver measurable benefits.
In sum, individual IAS/IFRS standards should be evaluated ex ante regarding whether they are
likely to be conducive to the ‘European public good’. We note that it is already challenging, even
when using 10 years of data, to present robust evidence on whether IFRS as a reporting system
delivered net benefits relative to local GAAP ex post and, thus, were so far ‘conducive to the
European public good’.38 Judgement of the effects of individual standards (where one has to dis-
entangle the effects of the new standard from the effects of all the other standards) and ex ante –
without any empirical data – is even more difficult.
5.2. A Public Interest Perspective
When trying to answer the question of what the EPG stands for, the consensus from many differ-
ent fields of public policy research is that although the references to the EPG in EU politics are
very frequent (see Sapir, 2003, p. 89), ‘there is a lack of clarity in setting out what exactly is
meant by a EPG’ (Zuleeg, 2009, p. 7). We make the following observations:
First, the reference clearly signifies the European public good. The EU-level of interest is dis-
tinct from a reference to a single national interest (e.g. relevant in case of adverse feedback in
endorsement mainly coming from one Member State) and from the global level of the IASB (see
Effects Analysis Consultative Group, 2014, para. 32–33; e.g. relevant when US interests inap-
propriately affect IFRS in the due process).
Second, we find that the component ‘public good’ is reflected in many official EU languages
as ‘public interest’.39 This distinction is relevant when operationalising the EPG as an endorse-
ment criterion because ‘public good’ is a concept rooted in public economics, while ‘public
interest’ is a concept from the political sciences. They differ in their definition and operationa-
lisation. The majority of EU languages, as we understand, rather follow the concept of ‘public
interest’ in the IAS Directive.
Third, political philosophy does not deliver a consensus on whether there exists, and what
would constitute, a ‘public interest’. Political scientists are split on whether they follow nor-
mative theories, abolitionist theories, process theories, or consensualist theories, each of
which has different implications on what constitutes ‘public interest’. While for some,
public interest in policy-making activities is nothing more than a rhetorical costume for
special interests (abolitionist), others consider public interest a valuable term that refers
to policy debate in which protagonists do consider morals, principles, and community
values in their reasoning over and above their own special interests (consensualists; see
Cochran, 1974).
Fourth, references to other EU policy areas do not provide much guidance. The literature dis-
cusses whether the EPG can be formed based on EU values and goals or (from the rationales of
EU policy) based on political, social, and environmental reasons. Accounting standards fall
under the EU’s strategy to create a Single Market. In general (see Van Mourik, 2013, p. 195),
accounting standards serve this interest by preventing capital markets from breaking down
due to uninformed investors withdrawing from capital markets (see Lev, 1988) or due to
informed investors having insufficient incentives to invest because of low-value information
sources (see Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980). However, any proposed changes to the existing
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IFRS (such as replacing IAS 39 with IFRS 9) are unlikely to have such massive effects. Their
contribution will be more subtle.
Fifth, due to the elusiveness of the criterion, the vast majority of independent accounting scho-
lars understand any ‘political’ intervention into the standard setting of experts and into the
content of technical accounting issues to be purely driven by the vested interests catering to
the needs of powerful industries resisting transparency (in abolitionist thinking).40 Based on
such concern, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) has devel-
oped a framework of issues to consider when justifying or challenging the justification of an
action as being in the public interest (see ICAEW, 2012, pp. 5–8). This ICAEW framework
is an honest attempt by the profession to help regulators and politicians in critically judging sug-
gestions put forward by vocal, vested interest groups on the grounds of being in the public inter-
est. We also observe a small number of an emerging type of politicians who focus on
‘transparency’ issues (many being affiliated with the European Greens), who are likely to be
less affected by corporate lobbying (because they use their independence as a commitment
device) and, thus, should be better advocates for transparency issues.41 The downside for stan-
dard setting is that they often try to use the umbrella of ‘accountability’ to push topics such as
consumer protection, gender issues, or carbon disclosures on the agenda, which are, at best,
loosely related to financial reporting standard-setting. Nevertheless, ‘the public interest and
the requirement to serve the public, has one meaning for members of the profession and
another meaning for members of the public’ (Dellaportas & Davenport, 2008, p. 1089).
5.3. Concepts of Serving the Public Interest
Private standard setters, such as the IASB, also claim to serve the ‘public interest’ primarily
through bringing ‘transparency, accountability and efficiency to financial markets’.42 Although
the IASB outlines in its recently published mission statement that their work serves the public
interest by ‘fostering trust, growth and long-term financial stability in the global economy’,
their working credo is nevertheless that those objectives will be automatically achieved in the
long run by making financial markets better, that is, they have no direct relevance to their stan-
dard-setting process. Furthermore, the IASB does not recognise any social responsibilities in its
constitution beyond those of establishing a set of high-quality accounting standards that will
‘help investors and other participants in the world’s capital markets and other users of financial
information make economic decisions’.43
When operationalising the public interest in setting accounting standards, the standard setters’
approach towards this issue has traditionally been to focus on the stated objectives of standard
setting, assuming that a standard should be in the public interest if it scores high on the technical
qualitative characteristics of the framework. More recently, standard setters have tried to
conduct a cost–benefit (or ‘economic’ or ‘effects’) analysis of individual standards.
5.3.1. Standard Setters’ Cost–benefit Analysis
Cost–benefit analysis is conceptually rooted in economics and is a widely used tool in public
sector decision-making, in particular in the infrastructure, transport, energy, and telecommuni-
cations sectors. For example, the EU has its own guide, comprising more than 250 pages, for the
cost–benefit analysis of investment projects (see European Commission, 2008a). Cost–benefit
analysis is a variant of classical capital budgeting that aims to start only those projects that
deliver a positive net present value. Implementing a cost–benefit analysis requires (a) identify-
ing and quantifying (i.e. assigning monetary value) to all expected benefits and costs, (b) allo-
cating those components to the relevant periods during which they are expected to be realised,
and (c) selecting the appropriate discount rate(s) (adjusted for risk and time value of money).
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Cost–benefit analysis can be further complicated by potential deadweight losses (might cause
excess burden or inefficient allocation of resources), distributional effects (might introduce
winners and losers into society), and behavioural effects (might have adverse effects on the be-
haviour of some constituents in society).44 Cost–benefit considerations have also been included
in the mission statements and conceptual frameworks of private accounting standard setters.
The introduction of these considerations into accounting standard setting historically origi-
nated from the SEC, a US governmental supervisory organisation where cost–benefit analysis,
or economic analysis, is an essential part of its rule-making. The SEC deferred the development
of accounting standards, along with its cost–benefit concept, to the private-sector standard
setter, the FASB, looking for leadership in setting accounting principles (Zeff, 2010).45 The
IASB, influenced by the US FASB, recently (re-)established a consultative group that published
in 2014 an extensive report on effects analysis46 in standard setting.47 That report responds to the
IFRS Foundation’s Trustees Strategy Review calling for more (economic) effects analysis (and
field testing) in the IASB’s due process (see IFRS Foundation, 2012, C3). Cost–benefit analysis
has since been embedded in the IASB’s due process at every major stage; a new IFRS standard or
change to an existing standard should only be mandated if its net benefits under the IASB’s
objectives outweigh its costs.
The core challenge in application is exactly how to conceptualise the benefits and costs of a
standard. The existing approaches differ in their ambition on how far such analysis could extend.
The FASB acknowledges that it is difficult or even impossible to make this assessment quanti-
tatively (see FASB, 1980, para. 144).48 The IASB should be more ambitious. First, they need to
explain how the suggested changes would improve the quality of financial statements, and why
these changes are justifiable. Second, they should verify that stakeholders fully understand the
decisions and the trade-offs of these decisions. Third, they should collect information and under-
take sufficient background analyses to anchor these decisions. That information should be col-
lected from outreach activities and fieldwork at different stages. The instruments to be used
should be primarily surveys, case studies and, where possible, simulations.
Overall, the IASB is attempting to conceptualise the benefits and costs without incurring the
cost of estimating each component quantitatively. For that purpose, they have developed a sub-
stantial repertoire of application guidance (see Effects Analysis Consultative Group, 2014, pp.
33–64). Experts estimate that attempts to go any further than that by trying to fully quantify each
benefit or cost component would be extremely costly and would still be imprecise and incom-
plete (see Schipper, 2010, p. 314).49
Nevertheless, expectations on the breadth and depth of a comprehensive cost–benefit analysis
by the IASB must take into consideration its standard-setting milieu in terms of both its resources
and operations. First, while the US Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) governing the FASB
has a planned budget of $58.0 million,50 the IFRS Foundation governing the IASB has only
around £25.0 ($36.5 million),51 despite its global focus. Second, the IASB is composed of
14 members from some 8 or 9 countries around the world, supported by a highly multinational
staff. The likelihood of such a large and culturally diverse institution agreeing on a standard
without making pragmatic and seemingly arbitrary compromises is not high, when even the
FASB struggles to find conceptually sound answers in a single country setting.
As with every new IFRS standard, the IASB published alongside its final IFRS 9 standard, in
their Basis for Conclusions, their own cost–benefit analysis of IFRS 9 (see IASB, 2014). This
comprehensive, 387-page single-spaced document outlines the core reasons behind the
IASB’s decisions regarding particular areas of IFRS 9 (e.g. classification and measurement,
impairment, hedge accounting), and it provides explanations of why the IASB did not follow
alternatives in controversial areas. Nearly 60 pages are dedicated to the analysis of the expected
effects of IFRS 9 only. The document outlines the major benefits to be expected from the new
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standard and assesses, based on IASB’s outreach activities, the likely costs at initial recognition
and on an ongoing basis for preparers and users. The Basis for Conclusions can be considered the
accumulation of insights gained over the lengthy due process when developing a standard and
should not be overlooked in the endorsement discussion.
5.3.2. A Second Layer of Cost–benefit Analysis in EU Endorsement
There is a need to recognise a degree of incongruency between the assignment of the IASB to
serve worldwide capital markets and the EU’s assignment to primarily ensure the welfare of its
Member States, or put differently, the EPG. Therefore, the criterion that a standard should be
‘conducive to the EPG’ requires a separate, new cost–benefit analysis for EU endorsement
and not just a review of the IASB’s analysis (see Schipper, 2010).52 We still suggest, operation-
ally, that the IASB’s effects analysis should be the starting point to understand the IASB’s ratio-
nales and the trade-offs of their decisions. Differences in the cost–benefit analysis of the EU
endorsement can emerge from: (a) a disagreement with the content of the IASB’s cost–
benefit analysis, (b) a deviation of the ‘European’ cost–benefit analysis, and (c) a difference
in the components of cost–benefit analysis considered by a public entity that is rooted in demo-
cratic principles and with legal enforcement responsibilities relative to a private-sector standard
setter.
(a) Disagreement with the content of the IASB’s cost–benefit analysis
With reference to point (a) above, we note that, of course, there can be other issues and costs
neglected in the IASB’s cost–benefit analysis and disagreement for many justified reasons.
However, when criticising the content and outlining suggested alternatives, one should transpar-
ently outline the expected benefits and costs of these alternative conclusions. To be fair, we often
see that IASB decisions are openly criticised, yet these critics too often do not explain or openly
discuss the issues that would emerge from proposed alternative options. It is the incremental
costs relative to the next alternative that matters in decision-making.
We also predict that disagreement about technical issues on the basis of clear articulation of
issues and reasons will probably be regarded in the accounting profession and among accounting
academics as the most credible approach to challenging IASB decisions, be it in the due process
ex ante or in endorsement decisions ex post.53 Vague references to the EPG that lack any credible
supporting evidence will be criticised almost by definition as catering to vested interests of
powerful industries, even if the political intervention is in fact due to the underlying intrinsic
belief. This deeply rooted belief is probably reflective of the influential work of Professor
Stephen A. Zeff and follow-up studies that have documented that politicians in the US interven-
ing in the standard-setting process of the FASB can be linked, even at a personal level in terms of
campaign contributions, to vested interests of powerful industries and their attempts to keep
transparency low (e.g. Bischof et al., 2016; Ramanna, 2008; Zeff, 2008, 2012). To date, there
are no examples in the scientific literature that document that politicians successfully intervened
in the standard-setting process to increase the transparency of financial reports.
We further observe that the IASB is not required to consider any ‘broader’ economic conse-
quences, because these are beyond its objectives (see Effects Analysis Consultative Group,
2014, para. 13). On that basis, it has been suggested that the EU would benefit from engaging
in broader deliberations with more stakeholders, including those who do not frequently
engage in the IASB’s or EFRAG’s consultations, and that the characteristics of the IASB
‘make it a challenge for stakeholders from outside the financial industry to engage with the
IASB’ (Botzem, 2015, p. 35). We would paint a more balanced picture:
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First, if those wider stakeholders would in fact be adversely affected by accounting standards,
they would certainly have incentives to engage more with standard setters, which they currently
do not do.54
Second, our informed observation – based on following the process for many years and
recently based on our own observation in the IFRS Advisory Council55 – is that the due
process is open to all interested parties and the feedback is collected transparently through
the IASB’s webpage. All parties that may have interests in accounting are invited to have a
word in the process, or are even in a proactive way invited to contribute.56
Third, while it sounds certainly persuasive to give ‘civil society stakeholders’ a more impor-
tant role in the process (see Botzem, 2015, p. 35), we question what their exact contribution and
role could be in a financial accounting standard setting.57 There is certainly a role for specialis-
ation here, similar to setting norms in other areas of life that require specific expertise and have
an important impact on society as a whole (e.g. in technical, environmental, or medical norms).
As a practical matter of fact, in the case of accounting for financial instruments, it is even dif-
ficult for (full-time) specialists like us to fully absorb and comprehend all challenges, trade-offs,
and details involved with a standard such as IFRS 9. However, an interesting idea could be to
grant transparency activists, individuals who have a credible personal trait to fight for transpar-
ency issues, an active voice in standard setting.58 If such individuals are persuaded in the process
by the standard setter that its intention is truly to improve transparency (and not caused by the
influence of the auditing profession or the financial sector, as often feared), such individuals
could more credibly communicate the fight for transparency when the standard setter is chal-
lenged by the vested interests of powerful preparers. The challenge, however, would be to
find such uncompromised individuals who show an interest in accounting.59
(b) Deviation of the ‘European’ cost–benefit analysis
We note, in reference to point (b) above, that the objectives of the EU as a large economic bloc
with approximately one quarter of the global GDP60 should, in general, not deviate much from
the global perspective of the IASB. Exceptions could primarily emerge from an observation in
the due process where the IASB would give in (too much) to the vested interests of other econ-
omic blocs and their particular economic set-up, most notably the US. To increase credibility,
objections in endorsement could, in such a case, pinpoint particular changes that the IASB
implemented in response to outside pressure.
Another plausible reason for a carve-out from a standard could be the particular economic set-
ups of an important industry in the EU that would truly be adversely affected. Carve-outs in other
jurisdictions are based on such motivation (see Ramanna, 2013, p. 22). However, we would urge
EU institutions involved in endorsement decisions to critically evaluate in detail how different
the economic set-up of an industry really is. For example, we do not believe that financial insti-
tutions that have traded equity and debt in financial markets in the EU (i.e. that are subject to
IFRS standards) have sufficient differences in their set-up or business activities relative to
their non-EU peers that would justify such argumentation with regard to IFRS 9.
(c) Difference in the components of cost–benefit analysis
We note, in reference to point (c) above, that the EU could be more specific in what it regards
as ‘constituting the EPG in the case of an accounting standard’. Legislators could specify
additions or alternatives when judging endorsements, relative to the IASB’s objectives
guiding their development of IFRS. We discuss recent contributions to this discussion in the sec-
tions below.
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5.3.3. The Maystadt Criteria
In response to the financial crises and following the recommendations of the ECOFIN Council,
the previous EU Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, Michel Barnier, commissioned
a report by Philippe Maystadt, former President of the European Investment Bank, to answer a
number of questions regarding the EU’s contribution to the development of IFRS (the Maystadt
Report; see also Walton, 2015). From the beginning, the introduction to this report makes it clear
that ‘policy choices in the field of accounting involve public interest stakes that should be con-
sidered more thoroughly’ and that ‘EFRAG, which should be Europe’s voice in the accounting
debate, is a technical committee with views that do not always take appropriate account of these
stakes’ (Maystadt, 2013, p. 5). The report, therefore, places even greater emphasis on the EPG
criterion based on the feedback of certain stakeholders who claim that positions held by EFRAG
in its endorsement advice are based on technical analyses of standards that do not adequately
assess the economic impact or the contribution of the standards to the public interest (Maystadt,
2013, p. 11).
In his policy recommendations, Mr Maystadt recommends that ‘the European Union could revise
its IFRS adoption criteria by supplementing and clarifying the current criteria of the IAS Regulation’
(Maystadt, 2013, p. 10). In particular, he recommends what he considers to be two components of the
public good: standards should not endanger financial stability, and they should not hinder the econ-
omic development of the Union (Maystadt, 2013, p. 10). He also asked the Commission to provide
guidance for interpreting the EPG criterion (Maystadt, 2013, p. 10). Follow-up work by Commission
Services and the newly instituted Expert Group on the IAS Regulation61 list in their IFRS endorse-
ment report a number of factors that should be considered in determining what constitutes the EPG
(see Expert Group on the IAS Regulation, 2014, p. 4):
. Is the standard consistent with EU competition law?
. Has the standard converged with US GAAP to ‘level the playing field’?
. Have the needs of different types of investors been considered?
. Have the needs of a broad range of users, including regulators, other stakeholder and credi-
tors, been considered?
. What are the broad economic effects of standards on employment or public policy?
. Do standards improve financial reporting?
. Is there a reference to the cost–benefit analysis?
However, the group acknowledges that these criteria can lead to additional definition issues
(Expert Group on the IAS Regulation, 2014, p. 4). We strongly agree with these concerns.
A standard ‘should not endanger financial stability’
The only tangible new operationalisation of the EPG criteria is the component that a stan-
dard ‘should not endanger financial stability’. However, years after the financial crisis, and
considering the significant media attention and incentives from regulators and the research
community to provide such evidence, there is still no evidence that can actually document
that specific accounting standards have played a significant role in, or have fostered the
crisis (see, e.g. Bank for International Settlements, 2015). Thus, an evidence-based showcase
that would reject IFRS endorsement based on fears of financial instability is an unlikely scen-
ario. A counter-argument that could be made is that prudential regulators, that is, those who do
have the mandate to ensure financial stability, should counterbalance any potential adverse
effects of accounting they may perceive in/via their own regulation (e.g. through prudential
filters; see Committee of European Banking Supervisors, 2004). The IASB, as part of its
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obligation as a member of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), has to ensure that the FSB (and
prudential regulators) have sufficient time to assess and potentially address how any change in
accounting standards should be reflected in prudential regulators’ own monitoring systems.62
We would stress again that introducing this new operationalisation of the EPG criterion in
the Maystadt Report has increased pressure on the IASB ex ante to place more importance on
issues put forward by prudential supervisors. That the IASB recently introduced a long-term
financial stability wording in its mission statement can be considered a reaction to this
pressure. We also observe from the comment letters of both EBA and European Central Bank
(ECB), both in charge of banking supervision in the EU, to EFRAG that their issues have been
reflected in the IASB’s due process when developing the new financial instruments standard.63
Both are supportive of the final wording of IFRS 9.
A standard ‘should not hinder the economic development of the Union’
The second new criterion, ‘should not hinder the economic development of the Union’, is
almost tautological and an invitation to industries to foster boilerplate defensive arguments of
vested interests trying to protect their own rents.64 For example, the first argument of the finan-
cial industry against every regulatory intervention is that new regulation or certain accounting
standards will lead to a credit crunch and, thus, to lower credit availability for small businesses,
ultimately hindering economic growth (see, e.g. Beresford, 1993; Zeff, 2008). Another current
example is the leasing industry, which strongly opposes a new leasing standard because they are
trying to protect their business model of enabling firms to show lower levels of debt than they
economically possess.
5.3.4. Inferring Stakeholders’ Cost–benefit Assessments from Observable Reactions
One market-based approach to derive stakeholders’ net benefits or costs of a new standard is to
analyse interest groups’ response to EFRAG’s call for comments on their draft endorsement
advice. These responses can expose, although biasedly, how stakeholders evaluate whether
IFRS meet the EU’s endorsement criteria.
The likelihood of participation in and feedback on the endorsement advice will be driven by
stakeholders’ relative expected benefits and costs of providing their feedback. Sutton’s (1984)
classical cost–benefit framework of stakeholder participation in standard setting can also be
applied to feedback on EFRAG’s draft endorsement advice. In particular, stakeholders who
have significant net costs from the new standard have greater incentives to file adverse endorse-
ment recommendations in response to positive EFRAG endorsement advice. Therefore, one can
infer from the type of respondent (e.g. preparer, auditor, user), the magnitude of letters from
organisations of a stakeholder group, and the distribution of concerns among different stake-
holder groups to what extent stakeholders in the EU perceive themselves to be negatively
affected.65
It is important to note, however, that stakeholders who expect net benefits from the new stan-
dards do not have similar incentives to respond to positive EFRAG endorsement advice. There-
fore, potential supportive feedback regarding positive EFRAG endorsement advice will
primarily come from commentators who always provide feedback as part of their job responsi-
bilities (e.g. active national standard setters; important EU institutions such as ESMA, EBA, and
ECB; and global organisations actively participating in standard-setting issues, such as Associ-
ation of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), ICAEW, International Federation of Accoun-
tants (IFAC), the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) Institute, or Financial Executives
International (FEI)).
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Overall, in the case of IFRS 9, we observe from the feedback on EFRAG’s draft endorsement
advice66 that the vast majority of stakeholders consider the new standard as contributing to the
EPG. There are only three notable exceptions:
. the insurance industry because of the pending IFRS 4 adoption,
. some commentators from France,67 and
. the UK-based LAPFF.68
Another market-based approach to derive shareholders’ perceptions of the net benefits or costs of
a new accounting standard is to study the stock market reactions to events that increase or
decrease the likelihood of the standard being published. With regard to the IFRS 9 due
process, research provides at least weak evidence for, on average, small positive share price
reactions to the IASB announcements.69
5.4. Conclusions
The criterion of the EPG is even vaguer than the first two endorsement criteria. As discussed in
Section 1, the vagueness is not necessarily harmful as it potentially increases the power that EU
institutions have ex ante over the IASB’s standard-setting process. Nevertheless, the vagueness
complicates a clear-cut ex post endorsement recommendation.
In our view, the only feasible way to assess the EPG criterion is by means of a comprehensive
cost–benefit analysis that considers the reactions of different stakeholders to the proposed stan-
dard. However, any cost–benefit analysis will, by definition, not lead to a unanimous conclusion,
as the costs and benefits will be borne by different parties affected by the final standard. Ulti-
mately, it is a political decision of how to weight the different costs and benefits of different
parties.
In the case of IFRS 9, for example, implementation costs seem to be the greatest for the insur-
ance industry, where IFRS 4 is still under revision by the IASB, with significant changes to some
of the IFRS 9 policies to be expected in the relatively short term. However, the key benefits of
IFRS 9, for example, from its greater understandability, will be obtained by other parties. There-
fore, there is probably a net cost for preparers in the insurance industry, while there is a net
benefit for some users of accounting information.
Overall, we still tend to conclude that, at least, many features of IFRS 9 are an improvement
over IAS 39, which would be the alternative if the EU voted against the endorsement of IFRS
9. Therefore, we argue that IFRS 9 is likely to be conducive to the EPG.
6. Overall Assessment
Sections 3–5 provide an individual assessment of each of the three endorsement criteria for a
new IFRS/IFRIC in the EU. For none of the three criteria do we find sufficient evidence that
could support the rejection in the case of IFRS 9 endorsement. As such, our assessment based
on the academic literature confirms the conclusions of EFRAG’s IFRS 9 endorsement
advice.
However, our discussion has also shown that the IAS Regulation 1606/2002 deliberately
provides European legislators with substantial leeway in the endorsement decision and
that endorsement is ultimately a political decision of weighting costs and benefits. Our dis-
cussion also shows that IFRS 9 provides at least some reasons for concern. In our overall
assessment below, we summarise these concerns and discuss the implications for the political
decision.
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6.1. IFRS 9 as an ‘Equilibrium Outcome’
IFRS 9 has been preceded by a decades-long controversy about the accounting for financial
instruments, especially in the banking sector. The IASB’s work programme on financial instru-
ments dates back to at least 1988 when the then-International Accounting Standards Committee
(IASC) set-up a work project. Despite intense efforts, the Joint Working Group of Standard
Setters failed in 1999 to provide a set of accounting rules that standard setters worldwide
could unanimously implement. While the original version of IAS 39 was adopted in 1998, it
underwent significant revision already in 2005.
The work on the new IFRS 9 started in 2009 right after the EU and the G20 called for a major
reform of bank accounting rules. The revision of specific parts of IAS 39 (on issues surrounding
portfolio hedges of interest rate risk) is still under discussion. It is thus fair to say that accounting
standards on financial instruments are among the most complex and the most controversial. The
reasons for the intensity of the debate are obvious:
First, the underlying cash flow structures of the instruments are inherently complex, as are
many of the transactions that the instruments are used for, where the same transaction can
have different economic substance in the different divisions of a universal bank (e.g. asset-liab-
ility management vs. trading).
Second, reliability issues are of particular importance for many financial instruments that are
infrequently traded and thus lack evidence on current values. Any valuation framework (both
cost-based and current value-based frameworks) faces enormous difficulties in providing reliable
estimates of valuation benchmarks that sufficiently limit managerial discretion over valuation inputs.
Third, accounting research shows that a potential solution is not clear-cut. The benefits of key
stakeholders in the debate (e.g. preparers from investment banking vs. preparers from commer-
cial banking, debt investors vs. equity investors, depositors vs. money market investors) vary
between the extremes of the debate (i.e. a full fair value-based system vs. a strict cost-based
system), so that no accounting solution can, by its very nature, be entirely neutral.
The involvement of the specific actors/stakeholders in the debate illustrates that accounting
standards have the potential to re-allocate economic resources (see Watts & Zimmerman,
1986). In fact, accounting research can trace the struggle to find an appropriate accounting
measurement basis back to medieval times.70 Regulators favoured different measurement
bases at different points in time.
For example, market-based valuation was viewed favourably right before the German Gru¨n-
derkrise in the 1870’s, before the Wall Street Crash and Great Depression in 1929, and before
the 2008/2009 Subprime Mortgage Crisis, and it was heavily opposed right after these crises. In
contrast, the 1980s saw a debate where the Savings and Loans Crisis in the US was attributed to
amortised cost accounting (Georgiou & Jack, 2011; Zeff, 2007). Even historically, it is therefore
hardly possible to find an appropriate consensus on the debate.
Against this historical background, IFRS 9 provides a current equilibrium outcome (see Watts
& Zimmerman, 1979, on the market for accounting theories). The analysis of comment letters,
the minutes of IASB meetings, the working papers of the IASB staff and the public discussion
surrounding the development of the standard all indicate that the views and concerns of all key
stakeholders have been considered in the development of the standard. The outcome is yet
another ‘mixed accounting model’ (see Walton, 2004, for a corresponding characterisation of
IAS 39), where fair value-based measurement is combined with amortised cost measurement
and where management is still left with substantial accounting choice (e.g. the fair value
option, the other comprehensive income (OCI) option, the hedge accounting option). The
final standard is therefore balancing largely incompatible interests of different parties and pro-
vides a solution that is far from either of the two extremes.
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The standard has all the characteristics of a political compromise. While this solution inevi-
tably introduces costs for some of the affected parties, any shift of the standard into one or the
other direction would incur additional costs for other parties that would need to be weighed
against questionable benefits.
Our view that the standard provides a balanced solution is also supported by the fact that the
interests of banking associations, as the most powerful and best-equipped lobbying groups,71 are
not entirely reflected in the new standard. These groups favoured a more radical cut-back on fair
value accounting that has not been achieved with the current standard that also reflects the inter-
est of users, for example, of financial analysts in this regard (see Bischof, Daske, & Sextroh,
2014; CFA Institute, 2008).
Overall, IFRS 9 represents an equilibrium outcome, given the current institutional set-up of
global accounting standard setting. It reflects the strength of arguments and powers of different
parties that participated in the process, most notably:
. the technical expertise, inherent accounting philosophy, and individual incentives of
accounting standard setters (IASB) and their staff,
. the conceptual arguments in the market for accounting theories (‘accounting
philosophies’),
. the insights into actual accounting practice from evidence on IAS 39 implementation (and
similar standards worldwide),
. the evidence academic research was able to provide on the benefits and costs of different
accounting regimes,
. the economic incentives and lobbying powers of various stakeholders, and
. ‘political considerations’, particularly anticipating ex post endorsement and achieving
convergence with the FASB.
During the extensive due process of IFRS 9, many fundamental changes proposed by the
IASB (e.g. a nearly complete elimination of the OCI option) were eliminated from the
final version of the standard. As a result, IFRS 9 is not very far from the accounting treatment
under IAS 39.
The most fundamental change comes from the new expected loss model for loan impair-
ments that will replace the incurred loss model of IAS 39 (see also Camfferman, 2015; Geb-
hardt, 2016; Hashim, Li, & O’Hanlon, 2016; Novotny-Farkas, 2016). After all, it is only fair
to conclude that the standard represents the global accounting community’s best effort after
six years of debate.
6.2. Weighing Costs and Benefits
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a comprehensive cost–benefit assessment of
IFRS 9 adoption in Europe, the following section highlights some of the key concerns that sta-
keholders brought forward during the IASB’s due process. For each remaining issue, we sum-
marise in Table 6 the main costs and the key benefits.
The four accounting topics that we summarise in Table 6 have attracted the most comments
during the IASB’s due process for IFRS 9 (and, to lesser extent, to EFRAG’s call for comments
on its draft endorsement advise). Our findings indicate that, apart from issues concerning the
adoption date for the insurance industry, all decisions that the IASB made on these issues
involve both, costs and benefits. Again, it is ultimately a political decision of how to trade-off
these costs and benefits against each other.
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Table 6. Summary of key concerns from the IASB’s due process.
Comment
Letter concern Cost Benefit
. Restriction of the
reclassification option
. Limitation of managerial
flexibility during a crisis
(limiting potential regulatory









actions during a crisis are
not impeded by the lack of
timely write-downs
. Restriction of the
recycling of OCI gains/
losses from equity
instruments
. Violation of the clean-surplus
principle
. Potential necessity for
adjustments of valuation
models
. Lack of informational
usefulness for long-term
business models
. Short-term monitoring is
crucial (and certainly
practised internally) even
for a long-term business
. Restriction discourages the
use of the option (i.e. limits
managerial accounting
discretion)
. Expected loss model . Complexity of valuation
models
. Inconsistency between the
IFRS 9 approach and the
Basel approach (i.e. costs
from parallel systems)
. Potential increase in
volatility
. Arbitrary distinction between
12-months and lifetime losses
. Greater timeliness of loss
recognition
. Positive association with
financial stability
. IFRS 9 model closer to
regulatory approaches than
the former IAS 39 model
. Potentially even greater
management discretion
under an incurred loss
model
. Different adoption dates
for IFRS 9 and (revised)
IFRS 4 in the insurance
industry
. Significant implementation
costs in the insurance
industry
. Lack of comparability over
multiple years
. Accounting inconsistencies
in the transition period





Source: Comment letters from the due process for the IFRS 9 project, www.iasb.org.
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The only exception is the divergence in the adoption dates of IFRS 9 and IFRS 4. The timing
of the adoption dates will incur significant costs for the insurance industry as well as for investors
when the consistency of financial statements over time is adversely affected twice in a row.
These costs could, at least in part, be avoided by a simultaneous adoption of both standards.
The adoption date (or, more precisely, the industry-specific transition period) is one issue
where the EU could use the endorsement criteria to justify a deviation from the original IFRS
9. Because this issue is unrelated to the accounting treatment of financial instruments as such,
a carve-out at this point would also likely not harm the acceptance of IFRS financial statements
on US capital markets.
There were other, more general concerns that participants in the IASB’s due process
addressed, for example, the alleged threat to financial stability or the potential increase in
volatility. We note that these concerns are not based on any hard evidence from serious aca-
demic research but reflect a purely subjective assessment. We are unable to provide a con-
clusive ex ante judgement on the economic consequences of IFRS 9. New accounting
standards do not just change the treatment for existing assets and liabilities; they can also
change investment behaviour, that is, they affect the composition of the balance sheet per
se. It is inherently difficult to predict those behavioural changes, and such a prediction
would require significant technical efforts that the assessments in the comment letters are
lacking.
6.3. Implications for the EU Endorsement Decision
Like any new accounting standard, IFRS 9 is the result of different forces participating in the IASB’s
due process. Different participants in the process favour different accounting regimes, with a market-
based regime and a cost-based regime representing the extreme positions that were brought forward.
The net benefits of the different accounting regimes vary across the different parties.
The final wording of IFRS 9, therefore, is a political compromise and thus a current ‘equili-
brium outcome’. It reflects a balanced ‘mixed measurement’ approach that incorporates the
different views of the participants in the debate. The new standard will not fundamentally
change the accounting treatment for financial instruments. The most significant change most
likely comes from the new expected loss approach to the impairment of loans.
Given that the views of the participants in the due process are largely incompatible, IFRS 9
will still result in significant costs for some parties (and in benefits for other parties). Therefore,
it is ultimately a political decision to weigh these costs and benefits against each other. The only
technical issue where costs tend to outweigh benefits are the different adoption dates of IFRS 9
and the revised IFRS 4 in the insurance industry. The diverging adoption dates will likely result
in unusually high implementation costs that are specific to the one industry.
Apart from this latter point, our judgement of IFRS 9 does not indicate that the standard
clearly violates one of the three endorsement criteria.
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Notes
1For an overview of the EU’s endorsement process, see Botzem (2015, p. 27, Figure 5). The latest update on IFRS and
interpretations pending endorsement and past endorsement decisions are provided in EFRAG’s ‘EU endorsement status
report’ at: http://www.efrag.org/Endorsement.
2The two Directives that the IAS Regulation 1606/2002 continues to refer to (Directive 78/660/EEC and Directive 83/
349/EEC) have been replaced by the Accounting Directive 2013/34/EU. However, the wording of the TFV principle
remained unchanged in Article 4 of the new Accounting Directive 2013/34/EU. In the following, we refer to all three
Directives as ‘the Accounting Directives’ in their respective context. See Appendix 1 for the corresponding legal texts
on the endorsement criteria.
3These are the EFRAG, the European Commission, the Accounting Regulatory Committee (ARC), the Council, and the
European Parliament.
4See http://ec.europa.eu/finance/accounting/ias/index_en.htm.
5See http://ec.europa.eu/finance/company-reporting/ifrs-financial-statements/index_en.htm for the EU’s underlying
objectives of IFRS adoption.
6See, for example, the discussion and proposal on reforming the current endorsement process in the Maystadt Report
(2013).
7The Maystadt Report proposes that the activities of EU institutions be bundled and coordinated by one institution alone
(e.g. EFRAG) to further enhance the EU’s influence over the IASB’s standard-setting; see Maystadt (2013).
8For details on the steps in the due process, corresponding feedback and board deliberations in the process replacing IAS
39 by IFRS 9, see http://www.ifrs.org/current-projects/iasb-projects/financial-instruments-a-replacement-of-ias-39-
financial-instruments-recognitio/Pages/Financial-Instruments-Replacement-of-IAS-39.aspx.
9The stakes are likely to be lower in case of an IFRIC interpretation on a specific technical issue.
10While some jurisdictions have already endorsed IFRS 9 (e.g. Canada, see http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/eng/fi-if/rg-ro/
gdn-ort/adv-prv/Pages/freifrs9.aspx), in others, new IFRS will automatically become legally binding. Our observation
is that many jurisdictions are closely following, if not awaiting, the EU’s endorsement decision.
11See, for example, Ordelheide’s (1993) discussion on whether the percentage-of-completion method in long-term pro-
duction is in accordance with the 4th Company Law Directive.
12For example, Ordelheide (1993, p. 83) argues that ‘if it is one’s opinion that the valuation principles of Art. 31 are
characterized by a certain degree of prudent income determination – and this seems conceivable – one has to
accept a similar prudent solution in order to reduce open areas and ambiguities’.
13See also the European Commission’s (1998) Interpretative Communication providing clarification of Article 2(5) of the
4th Company Law Directive: ‘In the interest of harmonisation, Member States may not use the last sentence of Article
2(5) in order to introduce an accounting rule of a general nature which is contrary to provisions of the Directive, nor can
they use this sentence to create additional options allowing for accounting treatments which are not in conformity with
the Directive’.
14Note that while there are many ECJ rulings that refer to the Accounting Directive’s TFV criterion, it is consensus in the
academic literature that it was and still is the Tomberger case that shaped the ECJ’s interpretation of the criterion. In
fact, more-recent cases, such as GIMLE SA (Case C-322/12) or Texdata Software GmbH (Case C-418/11), heavily rely
on the TFV interpretation in the Tomberger case (see the references in the more-recent verdicts). All related verdicts
can be retrieved via InfoCuria – Case-law of the Court of Justice at: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/recherche.jsf?cid=
238754.
15In other words, ‘The gateway of Art. 2 (5) seems to narrow for all derivations of British accounting from the accounting
principles and rules of the Fourth Directive’ (Ordelheide, 1993, pp. 83–84); see also European Commission (1998).
16See ECJ, Case C-234/94, p. I-3133, para. 15.
17See, for example, their Endorsement Advice on IFRS 9, para. 4, in EFRAG (2015a). This test is likely to be a response
to demand from particularly vocal stakeholders who placed specific emphasis on ‘prudence’ and actively lobbied the
EU institutions that were involved in the endorsement process (e.g. the UK Local Authority Pension Fund Forum
(LAPFF)). For an example, see the introductory statement by Haaker (2015) in the public hearing on IFRS 9 in the
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European Parliament (note that the other three experts in the hearing did not mention ‘prudence’ in their introductory
statements), see: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/events-hearings.html?id=20151201CHE00081.
18See, for example, different reports on the effects of accounting rules on the financial crisis: International Monetary
Fund (2008); De Larosie`re et al. (2009, para. 73–79); Marteau and Morand (2010); Bieg et al. (2008).
19See Bank for International Settlements (2015) for a comprehensive literature review. A 2008 SEC report on ‘Mark-to-
Market Accounting’ commissioned by the US Congress came to a similar conclusion; see SEC (2008) and also https://
www.sec.gov/spotlight/fairvalue.htm.
20Prudence is often defined as ‘caution in conditions of uncertainty’ (see, e.g. EFRAG, 2015b, para. 209). Conservatism
has historically meant not overstating assets and revenues, and not understating liabilities and expenses.
21A reason for this finding could be that the exercise of prudence allows the creation of hidden reserves or excessive
provisions by holding back profits in one year that may lead to their release in a subsequent period (either automatically
because the accruals reverse (e.g. Dechow, 1994) or by intentional selling of undervalued assets and the reporting of
exaggerated results).
22However, we predict that under IFRS 9, the ‘contractual cash flow characteristics test’ will likely lead to more classi-
fications into measurement categories outside cost than the business model test.
23In a sense, the wording seems to comply with the conceptual idea of the ‘Abkopplungsthese’ discussed in the German
literature since the 1970s (e.g. Moxter, 1979; Ordelheide, 1993).
24Barth (2007, p. 9): ‘Understandability is the quality of information that enables users who have a reasonable knowledge
of business and economic activities and financial reporting, and who study the information with reasonable diligence, to
comprehend its meaning’; see also IASB (2015a, para. 2.33–35) and EFRAG (2015b, para. 191).
25In addition, it is unclear how such an evaluation should address the evolution in complexity of the underlying economic
transactions over time. For example, in the case of financial instruments and innovations in financial engineering, one
can observe an ‘Arms Race’ between accounting standard setters and preparers over a period of decades; see Dye,
Glover, and Sunder (2015).
26See Barth (2007, p. 9): ‘Relevant information is capable of making a difference to a financial statement user’s decisions.
Relevant information has predictive value, i.e., it helps users to evaluate the potential effects of past, present, or future
transactions or other events on future cash flows, and confirmatory value, i.e., it helps to confirm or correct their pre-
vious evaluations’; see also IASB (2015a, para. 2.6–7) and EFRAG (2015b, para. 7).
27For example, Gassen (2008, p. 6) points out that value relevance ‘targets the alignment between accounting and market
information per se, without addressing the question whether accounting information is (potentially) useful to market
participants in valuation-related decisions or whether it merely constitutes an echo of information from more timely
sources which were already impounded into prices’.
28See IASB (2010, QC26): ‘Verifiability helps assure users that information faithfully represents the economic phenom-
ena it purports to represent. Verifiability means that different knowledgeable and independent observers could reach
consensus, although not necessarily complete agreement, that a particular depiction is a faithful representation. Quan-
tified information need not be a single point estimate to be verifiable. A range of possible amounts and the related prob-
abilities can also be verified’.
29Camfferman and Zeff (2015) concluded that it was the Americans, specifically the FASB, who drove the term
‘reliability’ out of the two boards’ Conceptual Frameworks in 2010. The FASB was also responsible for excising
the references to prudence and stewardship in the CF. See pp. 361–362, where FASB senior staff member Todd
Johnson argued that many had misinterpreted reliability to mean precision, and thus, it stood in the way of the
FASB requiring greater use of fair value measurements.
30EFRAG (2015b, para. 128): ‘Information has the quality of reliability when it is free from material error and bias and
can be depended upon by users to represent faithfully what it either purports to represent or could reasonably be
expected to represent, and is complete within the bounds of materiality and cost’. Para. 129: ‘There are a number of
aspects to the notion of reliability: freedom from material error and bias, faithful representation, and completeness’.
31See Schipper (2003, p. 62): ‘similar things are accounted for the same way, either across firms or over time’. Her defi-
nition includes consistency but does not explicitly state the ‘difference’ component; see also EFRAG (2015b, para.
152).
32See Barth (2007, p. 9): Consistency ‘refers to the use of the same accounting policies, either from period to period
within an entity or in a single period across entities’; see also IASB (2015a, para. 2.25).
33Recent research by Chen, Miao, and Shevlin (2015) has suggested a novel measure of disclosure quality based on the
disaggregation of accounting data.
34See De Franco et al. (2011), Barth et al. (2012), and Yip and Young (2012, p. 1769). The concepts they use to oper-
ationalise ‘comparability’ are ‘similarity of accounting functions’, ‘accounting system comparability’, ‘value relevance
comparability’, and the ‘degree of information transfer, as measured by the association between the earnings surprise of
an announcing firm and the contemporaneous stock price movements of other firms’.
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35Note that comparability is distinct from uniformity, as there could be circumstances where one accounting option
would suit the underlying economics better than the alternative. Similarly, the use of managerial discretion seems una-
voidable no matter how narrowly a standard is framed.
36Note that the intention behind the IASB’s revision of its conceptual framework is to reduce this conflict by exclusively
focusing on external users of accounting information. The objective has resulted in the removal of ‘stewardship’ as a
purpose and the verbal downgrade of ‘prudence’ in the qualitative characteristics of the exposure draft.
37Alexander (2006, p. 71) goes further, arguing that ‘The phrase was presumably inserted by politicians, for politicians’.
This critique is repeated in Alexander and Eberhartinger (2010, p. 57): ‘It is particularly noteworthy that the criterion
singled out for emphasis [the European public good] is, as stated above, undefinable, completely unmeasurable and
nothing to do with accounting’.
38On 18 June 2015, the European Commission (2015) issued a staff working document on the evaluation of the IAS
Regulation, providing a summary of the process and output. Further extensive reviews have been conducted recently
after 10 years of IFRS usage; see, for example, ICAEW (2015) and De George, Li, and Shivakumar (2016) and the
empirical evidence in, for example, Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2008), Barth et al. (2012), Daske et al. (2008,
2013), and Christensen et al. (2013).
39See the German, French, Italian, and Spanish language versions on EurLex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX:32002R1606): ‘im europa¨ischen o¨ffentlichen Interesse’, ‘l’inte´reˆt public europe´en’, ‘interesse pub-
blico europeo’, ‘el intere´s pu´blico europeo’. For a critical discussion on different language used in national implemen-
tations and translations of Directive 2013/34/EU, see Alexander (2015).
40See, for example, Alexander’s (2006) interpretation of Jacques Chirac’s letter to Romano Prodi. See also Ramanna
(2013) on IFRS endorsement and carve-outs in other countries around the world. The ICAEW (2012) contemplates
in its report on ‘Public Interest’ that ‘there can be a natural suspicion that the phrase may be used as a smokescreen
to garner support for something that is actually in the advocate’s own interests’. See http://www.icaew.com/en/
technical/ethics/the-public-interest.
41See, for example, the webpage of Sven Giegold (European Greens and Member of ECON Committee of the European
Parliament) and his statements on IFRS, http://www.sven-giegold.de/.
42See the IFRS Foundation’s Mission Statement: ‘Our mission is to develop International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS) that bring transparency, accountability and efficiency to financial markets around the world. Our work serves
the public interest by fostering trust, growth and long-term financial stability in the global economy’. http://www.ifrs.
org/About-us/Pages/IFRS-Foundation-and-IASB.aspx; see also IASB (2015b), where the IASB outlines in detail how it
proposes to serve the public interest.
43See the Objectives of the IFRS Foundation’s Constitution, where it states ‘to develop, in the public interest, a single set
of high quality, understandable, enforceable and globally accepted financial reporting standards based upon clearly
articulated principles. These standards should require high quality, transparent and comparable information in financial
statements and other financial reporting to help investors, other participants in the world’s capital markets and other
users of financial information make economic decisions’ IFRS Foundation (2012).
44See Schipper (2010) for an excellent summary.
45The FASB discussed the possible application of cost–benefit analyses to accounting standard setting back in 1991 (see
FASB, 1991). See also Zeff’s (1978) early discussion of ‘economic consequences’ arguments.
46The re-labelling from ‘cost-benefit’ to ‘effects’ analysis in accounting standard setting follows the in-depth analysis of
Schipper (2010, p. 316), who suggests that ‘“effects” may result in a better description of the cognitive process actually
used by standard setters to weigh the consequences of authoritative guidance’.
47See Effects Analysis Consultative Group (2014): The core objectives to consider are to improve the quality of financial
information (para. 12). According to its objectives, the IASB is de jure not required to consider the broader economic
consequences of its standards (para. 13); de facto, however, broad stakeholder participation, the openness of the
process, and the incentives of affected parties ensures that those concerns are heard.
48See also FASB (1978, para. 23): ‘[T]he benefits from financial information are usually difficult or impossible to
measure objectively, and the costs often are; different persons will honestly disagree about whether the benefits of
the information justify its costs’.
49The difficulties of conducting quantitative analysis based on comprehensive real-world data are illustrated in the case of
IFRS 9 when even the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) openly admitted on request of the European Parliament
that ‘ESRB has not yet assessed the impact of the new accounting standards on the financial sector as a whole. Draghi
explained that this was down to the “poor quality of the data available and uncertainty as to whether – and if so how –
capital regulation might change in the light of the new accounting rules”’; see Bouvier (2016).
50See http://www.accountingfoundation.org/jsp/Foundation/Page/FAFSectionPage&cid=1351027545591. Note that the
FAF contributions also cover the expenses of the GASB.
51See http://www.ifrs.org/About-us/IFRS-Foundation/Oversight/Financing/Pages/Financing.aspx. The budget is in
British Pounds; approximate conversion in May 2016.
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52Note that only reviews of upstream cost–benefit analyses are also observable in other public policy areas. See Schipper
(2010, fn. 13).
53See Giner & Arce (2012). They find that standard setters react primarily to conceptual arguments in standard setting
debates.
54A reason may be significant barriers to entry based on required technical expertise.
55Holger Daske has been representing the International Association of Accounting Educators and Researchers (IAAER)
in the IFRS Advisory Council since 2015 (http://www.iaaer.org/). Note that IAAER is a non-profit organization, that is,
there is no compensation for Advisory Council members, and academic independence is uncompromised.
56For example, various stakeholders in the wider non-financial reporting community have presented their views in the
past few years’ IFRS Advisory Council Meetings, such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI); see http://www.
ifrs.org/About-us/IFRS-Advisory-Council/meetings/Pages/IFRS-Advisory-Council-2016.aspx and the meetings of
the years before.
57We note that there can certainly be a role for wider non-financial socio-economic reporting requirements, such as laid
down in the Non-financial Reporting Directive 2014/95/EU (amending Directive 2013/34/EU); see http://ec.europa.eu/
finance/company-reporting/non-financial_reporting/index_en.htm.
58Note that Board members who are active academics have fulfilled this role in the past in the FASB and IASB. At the
time of writing, IASB Member Dr Chungwoo Suh is a Professor of Accounting at Kookmin University, Seoul.
59We further observe that the typical older age of IASB board members (who tend to make the board membership the last
step in their career prior to retirement) enhances their independence from vested interest groups (e.g. the auditing
sector) and limits ‘revolving door’ concerns. However, there are more-frequent job transfers from within the organiz-
ation of the IFRS foundation at the level of staff involved in standard setting.
60See Eurostat: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/The_EU_in_the_world_-_economy_and_
finance.
61The Commission set up the group to (a) evaluate the impact of IFRS within the EU against its original aims, and (b) take
into account the recommendations of the Maystadt Report; see: http://ec.europa.eu/finance/accounting/governance/
committees/evaluation/index_en.htm.
62See Effects Analysis Consultative Group (2014, para. 20). For example, EBA notes in their feedback to EFRAG that
they are aware of several interactions with the prudential regulatory framework; see feedback letters to the EFRAG
Draft endorsement advice.
63For example, the ECB summarises that ‘Furthermore, the ECB is not aware of any objective reason suggesting that
IFRS 9 is not conducive to the European Public Good. On the contrary, some aspects of IFRS 9 may be an improvement
from a financial stability perspective’; see feedback letters to the EFRAG Draft endorsement advice; http://www.efrag.
org/Front/p328-5-272/IFRS-9—Financial-Instruments.aspx.
64Similar arguments have been put forward, for instance, in the stock options debate; see, for example, Farber, Johnson,
and Petroni (2007).
65Note that such feedback may or may not be similar to comment letter participation in the IASB’s due process. Current
research analysing comment letters to EFRAG illustrates descriptively that the group of respondents is not identical,
and therefore, there seem to be idiosyncratic incentives to participate in EFRAG’s call re their endorsement advice,
for example, Weiss (2015).
66See http://www.efrag.org/Front/p328-5-272/IFRS-9—Financial-Instruments.aspx.
67The two institutions that have concerns are the French Autorite´ des Normes Comptables (ANC) and the Task Force on
Long Term Investment of the Paris Financial Center.
68Note that the Local Authority Pension Fund Forum, a private-sector lobbying group, has recently commissioned a
series of legal opinions by QC George Bompas questioning the UK Financial Reporting Council’s (FRC) working
interpretation of TFV; see http://www.lapfforum.org/news/LAPFF-obtains-further-Legal-Opinion-from-George-
Bompas-QC. These opinions have been responded to by the legal opinion of QC Martin Moore, commissioned by
the FRC; see https://frc.org.uk/News-and-Events/FRC-Press/Press/2013/October/Accounting-standards-are-part-of-
legally-binding-c.aspx; see also Nobes (2015).
69See Onali and Ginesti (2014). Such tests, by design, focus on the effects of a new standard on shareholders only.
70See Richard (2004) for the case of France, Georgiou and Jack (2011) for Great Britain, and Hoffmann and Detzen
(2013) for Germany.
71See Alexander (2006) for the EU and Zeff (2008) for the US.
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2. The international accounting standards can only be adopted if:
they are not contrary to the [TFV] principle set out in ex-Article 2(3)
of Directive 78/660/EEC and in ex-Article 16(3) of Directive 83/349/
EEC [now Article 4 (3) of Directive 2013/34/EU] and are conducive
to the European public good and,
they meet the criteria of understandability, relevance, reliability and
comparability required of the financial information needed for




[4th Company Law Directive; repealed] 3. The annual accounts shall
give a true and fair view of the company’s assets, liabilities, financial
position and profit or loss.
Article 16 (3)b
83/349/EEC
[7th Company Law Directive; repealed] 3. Consolidated accounts shall
give a true and fair view of the assets, liabilities, financial position




3. The annual financial statements shall give a true and fair view of the
undertaking’s assets, liabilities, financial position and profit or loss.
Where the application of this Directive would not be sufficient to give
a true and fair view of the undertaking’s assets, liabilities, financial
position and profit or loss, such additional information as is
necessary to comply with that requirement shall be given in the notes
to the financial statements.
Source: EU Official Journal.
aSee http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31978L0660&from=EN for the text of the
repealed Directive.
bSee http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31983L0349:en:HTML for the text of the repealed
Directive.
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